Making and bending international rules : the design of exceptions and escape clauses in trade law / Krzysztof J. Pelc.
2016
K3943 .P45 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Making and bending international rules : the design of exceptions and escape clauses in trade law / Krzysztof J. Pelc.
Published
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Copyright
©2016
Call Number
K3943 .P45 2016
ISBN
9781107140868 (hardback ; alk. paper)
1107140862 (hardback ; alk. paper)
1107140862 (hardback ; alk. paper)
Description
xii, 285 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)950574706
Summary
All treaties, from human rights to international trade, include formal exceptions that allow governments to legally break the rules that they have committed to, in order to deal with unexpected events. Such institutional "flexibility" is necessary, yet it raises a tricky theoretical question: how to allow for this necessary flexibility, while preventing its abuse? Krzysztof Pelc examines how designers of rules in vastly different settings come upon similar solutions to render treaties resistant to unexpected events. Essential for undergraduate students, graduate students, and scholars in political science, economics, and law, the book provides a comprehensive account of the politics of treaty flexibility. Drawing on a wide range of evidence, its multi-disciplinary approach addresses the paradoxes inherent in making and bending international rules.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 267-277) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of Tables
ix
Acknowledgments
xi
1.
"Architectural Challenge" of International Rules
1
1.1.
Introduction
1
1.2.
Trade Regime's Architectural Challenge
5
1.3.
Dirty Secret of the Trade Regime
7
1.4.
Design of Escape Provisions
10
1.5.
Accident of History
12
1.6.
Overview of Chapters
13
2.
Theory of the Design of Flexibility
18
2.1.
Debate over Flexibility in International Treaties
18
2.2.
Costs of Flexibility
27
2.3.
Resolving the Architectural Challenge
31
2.4.
Assessing Theoretical Expectations
39
3.
Brief Intellectual History of Flexibility in Law
43
3.1.
Universality of Flexibility
44
3.2.
"Necessity Knows No Law"
45
3.3.
Changed Circumstances
75
4.
Twin GATT Exceptions: Fears and Solutions
93
4.1.
Article XXI: The GATT Security Exception
93
4.2.
Article XX: The Value of Constraint
122
4.3.
Conclusion: Article XXI vs. Article XX
132
5.
Evolving Design of Flexibility
137
5.1.
From Compensation to Contingency
138
5.2.
What Room for Efficient Breach?
150
5.3.
Trade Policymakers' Remaining Flexibility Options
161
5.4.
Flexibility in Preferential Trade Agreements
185
5.5.
Comparison Case: Flexibility in the Human Rights Regime
189
6.
Bad News
206
6.1.
Does Flexibility Fuel the Law of Constant Protection?
206
6.2.
Empirical Data
209
6.3.
Flexibility and Unpredictability
220
7.
Good News
234
7.1.
Restraint in Allocation of Flexibility
235
7.2.
"Country Seeks Credibility": How Governments Choose among Flexibility Options
243
8.
Great Recession and Beyond
259
8.1.
Rules vs. Behavior during the Great Recession
261
8.2.
What Does the Future Hold?
264
Bibliography
267
Index
279