Economics for competition lawyers / Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, James Kavanagh.
2016
K3850 .N54 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Economics for competition lawyers / Gunnar Niels, Helen Jenkins, James Kavanagh.
Published
Oxford , United Kingdom : Oxford University Press, 2016.
Call Number
K3850 .N54 2016
Edition
Second edition.
ISBN
9780198717652 (pbk.)
0198717652 (pbk.)
0198717652 (pbk.)
Description
xxxvi, 508 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)946770565
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 479-487) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
List of Figures
xiii
List of Tables
xv
Table of Cases
xvii
Table of Legislation
xxxi
List of Abbreviations
xxxv
1.
Introduction: Starting from First Principles
1
1.1.
Competition Economics and You
1
1.2.
What Does Economics Contribute to Competition Law?
2
1.3.
Book's Approach to Explaining Competition Economics
6
1.4.
Explaining Some Basic Principles the Economic Naturalist's Way
7
1.5.
Some Health Warnings on Competition, Competition Policy, and Competition Economists
15
1.6.
Remainder of the Book, and What's New in this Second Edition
19
2.
Market Definition
23
2.1.
Why Market Definition?
24
2.2.
Dimensions of the Relevant Market
28
2.3.
Demand Side: Substitution and Elasticities
30
2.4.
Hypothetical Monopolist Test
35
2.5.
Critical Loss Analysis
47
2.6.
Cellophane Fallacy
54
2.7.
Supply-side Substitution and Market Aggregation
56
2.8.
Price Discrimination Markets
62
2.9.
Chains of Substitution
64
2.10.
Other Aspects of Geographic Market Definition
66
2.11.
Market Definition for Complements and Bundles
72
2.12.
Markets Along the Vertical Supply Chain
77
2.13.
Product Substitution Versus Product Migration
82
2.14.
Market Definition for Features Other than Price
83
2.15.
Quantitative Tools for Market Definition
86
2.16.
Conclusion: Why Market Definition?
92
3.
Market Power
93
3.1.
Central Concern in Competition Law
94
3.2.
Market Shares and Concentration Measures
99
3.3.
Entry and Exit Barriers
107
3.4.
Profitability as a Measure of Market Power
115
3.5.
Buyer Power and Bidding Markets
129
3.6.
Behavioural Economics and Market Power
136
3.7.
Market Power, Investment, and Innovation
146
4.
Abuse of Dominance
151
4.1.
Successful Competitor or Bull in a China Shop?
152
4.2.
General Principles for Assessing Exclusionary Conduct
156
4.3.
Cost Benchmarks for Exclusionary Conduct
163
4.4.
Predation
171
4.5.
Price Discrimination
181
4.6.
Quantity, Loyalty, and Exclusivity Rebates
189
4.7.
Margin Squeeze
199
4.8.
Bundling and Tying
204
4.9.
Refusal to Supply and Essential Facilities
214
4.10.
Excessive Pricing
222
5.
Cartels and Other Horizontal Agreements
233
5.1.
Are All Cartels Bad?
233
5.2.
Economic Characteristics of Hardcore Cartels
240
5.3.
Concerted Practices and Information Sharing
243
5.4.
Co-operation Among Competitors: Joint Purchasing, Joint Selling, and Other Forms of Collaboration
249
5.5.
Technology and Intellectual Property Agreements: Beneficial or Anti-competitive?
257
5.6.
Finding Cartels: Can Economics Help?
263
6.
Vertical Restraints
269
6.1.
Business Practices, the Law, and the Economics
269
6.2.
Economic Rationales for Vertical Restraints
273
6.3.
Is a Restraint a Restriction? Counterfactual Analysis under Article 101(1)
282
6.4.
Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Restraints
284
6.5.
`Hardcore Vertical Restraints': Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories
287
6.6.
Vertical Restraints in Online and Digital Markets
290
7.
Mergers
297
7.1.
Mergers Under Scrutiny
298
7.2.
Substantive Test: SLC, SIEC, and Other Variants
300
7.3.
Counterfactual: Current Market, Entry, or Failing Firm?
304
7.4.
Unilateral Effects: Assessing Closeness of Competition
310
7.5.
Unilateral Effects: Simulating Price Rises
320
7.6.
Co-ordinated Effects
330
7.7.
Non-horizontal Mergers
338
7.8.
Minority Shareholdings
345
7.9.
Merger Efficiencies
349
8.
Design of Remedies
359
8.1.
After the Diagnosis, What's the Cure?
359
8.2.
Structural Remedies in Mergers
363
8.3.
Structural Remedies in Conduct Cases
367
8.4.
Behavioural Remedies: Price and Access
372
8.5.
Behavioural Remedies: FRAND
378
8.6.
Behavioural Remedies: Insights from Behavioural Economics
385
8.7.
Setting Fines
393
8.8.
Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Remedies, and of Competition Law
400
9.
Quantification of Damages
407
9.1.
Damages Claims, Economics, and the Law
408
9.2.
Harm from Hardcore Cartels: Conceptual Framework
412
9.3.
Harm from Exclusionary Conduct: Conceptual Framework
418
9.4.
Classification of Methods and Models for Quantifying Damages
423
9.5.
Comparator-based Approaches: Cross-sectional
428
9.6.
Comparator-based Approaches: Time Series
431
9.7.
Comparator-based Approaches: Difference-in-Differences
436
9.8.
Approaches Based on Financial Analysis
437
9.9.
Approaches Based on Market Structure and Industrial Organization Theory
441
9.10.
Pass-on of Overcharges
445
9.11.
Interest and Discounting
454
10.
Use of Economic Evidence in Competition Cases
459
10.1.
Smokescreens and Mud-slingers?
459
10.2.
Best Practice in Presenting Economic Evidence
460
10.3.
Economists in Court: When Can You Rely on Them?
462
10.4.
Economists in Court: Do They Get a Fair Hearing?
467
10.5.
Use of Economics in Competition Law: A Promising Future?
470
Bibliography
479
Index
489