Foreign affairs federalism : the myth of national exclusivity / Michael J. Glennon, Robert D. Sloane.
2016
KF4651 .G594 2016 (Map It)
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Title
Foreign affairs federalism : the myth of national exclusivity / Michael J. Glennon, Robert D. Sloane.
Published
Oxford ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2016]
Call Number
KF4651 .G594 2016
ISBN
9780199941490 (hardback : alk. paper)
0199941491 (hardback : alk. paper)
0199941491 (hardback : alk. paper)
Description
xxiii, 404 pages ; 25 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)923728070
Summary
"Challenging the myth that the federal government exercises exclusive control over U.S. foreign-policymaking, Michael J. Glennon and Robert D. Sloane propose that we recognize the prominent role that states and cities now play in that realm. Foreign Affairs Federalism provides the first comprehensive study of the constitutional law and practice of federalism in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. It could hardly be timelier. States and cities recently have limited greenhouse gas emissions, declared nuclear free zones and sanctuaries for undocumented immigrants, established thousands of sister-city relationships, set up informal diplomatic offices abroad, and sanctioned oppressive foreign governments. Exploring the implications of these and other initiatives, this book argues that the national interest cannot be advanced internationally by Washington alone. Glennon and Sloane examine in detail the considerable foreign affairs powers retained by the states under the Constitution and question the need for Congress or the president to step in to provide "one voice" in foreign affairs. They present concrete, realistic ways that the courts can update antiquated federalism precepts and untangle interwoven strands of international law, federal law, and state law. The result is a lucid, incisive, and up-to-date analysis of the rules that empower-and limit-states and cities abroad."--Publisher's website.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Gift
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Added Author
Gift
The Arthur W. Diamond Law Library
Purchased from the income of the Edith L. Fisch Fund
Table of Contents
Preface
xv
Acknowledgments
xxv
1.
Why Empower States?
1
I.
Origins of American Federalism
2
II.
Federalism in the New Constitution
16
III.
Functional Rationale for Federalism
22
A.
Case for the States
22
1.
Freedom
23
2.
Efficiency
24
3.
Innovation
25
B.
Case against the States
26
1.
Inapplicability of the Traditional Federalist Rationales
27
2.
Danger of Retaliation against the Entire Nation
29
IV.
Assessment
31
2.
States, Cities, and Globalization
35
I.
Globalization Driver
36
II.
Federal Incapacity
45
III.
State Capacity
55
IV.
State Activities in the International Realm
60
A.
Compacts and Agreements with Foreign Countries
60
B.
Adoption of International Standards
62
C.
State Offices in Foreign Countries
64
D.
State Representatives to Foreign Countries
67
E.
State Incentives to Attract Foreign Business
68
F.
Sister-City Relationships
68
G.
State Foreign Policy Statements
69
H.
State Economic Sanctions and Trade Bans
70
I.
"Buy American" Requirements
71
J.
State Taxation of Foreign Businesses
71
K.
State Restrictions on Immigrants
72
L.
State Regulatory Prohibitions and Restrictions
73
V.
Conclusion
76
3.
Constitutional Methodology and the Role of the Courts
77
I.
Constitutional Methodology
78
II.
Role of the Courts
81
4.
Dormant Foreign-Affairs Preemption
87
I.
Introduction
87
II.
Origins
92
A.
Holmes v. Jennison (1840)
92
B.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936)
98
C.
Clark v. Allen (1947)
101
III.
Invention of the Dormant Foreign-Affairs Doctrine
103
A.
Zschernig v. Miller (1968) and Its Progeny
103
B.
American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi (2003)
121
IV.
Assessment
129
A.
Federal Exclusivity
130
1.
Per Se Federal Exclusivity
131
2.
Balancing Tests
133
B.
Judicial Abstention
135
C.
Alternative Limiting Principles
137
1.
State Motive
138
2.
State Negotiation with a Foreign Government
138
3.
Sitting in Judgment on a Foreign Government
140
4.
Challenges to Federal National Security Policy
141
5.
Traditional State Competence
142
V.
Conclusion
144
5.
Dormant Foreign Commerce Preemption
147
I.
Evolution of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
151
A.
From Gibbons to Blackbird Creek
151
B.
Rise and Fall of the Cooley Doctrines
154
C.
Modern Standard: Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Pike v. Bruce Church
158
D.
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
160
II.
Origins and Development of the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
162
A.
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles (1979)
163
B.
Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board (1994)
166
C.
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios (1994)
167
D.
Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
168
III.
Assessment
171
Synthesizing and Simplifying Dormancy Standards
177
6.
Treaty Power
185
I.
Introduction
185
II.
Treaty Clause Versus the Tenth Amendment?
189
III.
Deciphering Holmes's Cryptic Opinion in Holland
193
A.
Textual Rationale
194
B.
Force of Functionalism and Adaptivism in Holland
196
1.
How Holmes Framed the Constitutional Question---And Why
196
2.
Holland's Functionalist Rationale
199
3.
Andrews Analogy
200
C.
Anachronism?
203
IV.
How Bond Hobbled Holland
205
A.
Court's Attempt to Sidestep Holland
206
B.
Why the Court's Attempt to Sidestep Holland Failed
208
1.
Neglect of Holland's Own Federalism Principles
208
2.
Holland's Uniform Standard: Treaties and Implementing Legislation
209
3.
Unavoidable Conflict Between Holland and Bond
212
4.
Bond's Misguided "Background Principle"
213
5.
Carey v. South Dakota: The Constitutional Avoidance Canon in Context
218
V.
Critiques of Holland: Theory and Practice
220
A.
Before Bond: States' Rights, Individual Rights, and the Lessons of History, Experience, and Jurisprudence
221
B.
Political and Legal Limits of Holland
225
1.
Political Constraints: A Short, Not-So-Horrible Parade
225
2.
Legal Constraints: The Scope of Holland
228
VI.
Holland and the Modern Law of Treaties
234
A.
After Bond: The Treaty Power and Federalism in Contemporary Perspective
234
B.
What the Future Holds
236
C.
Postwar Revolution of Treaty Law
237
D.
Medellin's New Incoherence
239
E.
U.S. Treaty Practice After Bond
243
VII.
Conclusion
244
7.
Federal Common Law and State Power
247
I.
Introduction: Federal Common Law's Status and Legitimacy
247
A.
Act of State Doctrine
251
B.
Customary International Law
153
II.
What is Customary International Law?
256
Where Does Customary International Law Fit into U.S. Federal and State Law?
258
III.
Which Rules of Customary International Law Apply?
264
Federal---or State---Common Law?
271
IV.
Assessment
272
8.
Federal Approval: The Compact Clause
277
I.
From the Clear to the Unclear
278
II.
Contemporary Practice
279
III.
Problem Fades
283
IV.
States' Rights and the Compact Clause
287
V.
Assessment
289
9.
Federal Disapproval: Preemption
291
I.
Preemption of State Law by Federal Statute
294
A.
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000)
296
B.
Immigration
300
II.
Preemption of State Law by Treaty
307
III.
Preemption of State Law by Executive Agreement
309
A.
Judicial Precedents
312
B.
Analytic Options
314
IV.
Assessment
315
10.
Case Study: States as Cyber-Defenders
319
I.
Growing Threat from Cyber-Intrusions
321
II.
Weakness of International Law
324
III.
Crazy Quilt of Federal Statutory Law
326
IV.
States Step into the Void
332
V.
Lawfulness of State Data Protection Initiatives
336
A.
International Legal Concerns
336
B.
Retaliation
339
C.
Massachusetts Legal Concerns
339
D.
Federal Constitutional Concerns
342
E.
Due Process
342
F.
Preemption
343
G.
Dormant Foreign Affairs Power
344
H.
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
344
I.
Market Participant Doctrine
345
VI.
Opening for State Entrepreneurship?
347
11.
Conclusion
351
I.
Summary
351
II.
Foreign Affairs Federalism in Other Nations
360
A.
Switzerland
362
B.
Canada
364
C.
Germany
365
D.
India
366
III.
Making Versus Interpreting a Constitution
368
Table of Cases
371
Index
385