The regulation of international trade / Petros C. Mavroidis.
2016
K3943 .M393 2016 (Map It)
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Details
Title
The regulation of international trade / Petros C. Mavroidis.
Published
Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press, [2016]
Call Number
K3943 .M393 2016
ISBN
9780262029841 (v. 1 : hardcover)
0262029847 (v. 1 : hardcover)
9780262029995 (v. 2 : hardcover)
0262029995 (v. 2 : hardcover)
0262029847 (v. 1 : hardcover)
9780262029995 (v. 2 : hardcover)
0262029995 (v. 2 : hardcover)
Description
2 volumes : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)922799629
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
xxv
Introduction
xxvii
1.
From GATT to the WTO
1
1.1.
Establishing a Multilateral Trade Order
1
1.1.1.
From Drudgery to Excitement
1
1.1.2.
Attempts to Liberalize Trade at the Multilateral Level
2
1.1.2.1.
1927 World Economic Conference: Not Suitable
2
1.1.2.2.
1933 World Economic Conference: Prewar Pilots
4
1.1.2.3.
World Trade before Bretton Woods
6
1.1.3.
Bretton Woods and Trade
7
1.1.4.
Follow-up to Bretton Woods
7
1.1.4.1.
Hull and Nondiscriminatory Trade
7
1.1.4.2.
Other Side of the Pond: Meade and the International Commercial Union
9
1.1.4.3.
Bilateral Attempts to Tame Imperial Preferences: Keynes Enraged
10
1.1.4.4.
Atlantic Charter
11
1.1.5.
Onto the World Scene
12
1.1.5.1.
From the Atlantic Charter to the "Suggested Charter"
12
1.1.5.2.
US Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
14
1.1.5.3.
List of Invitees
14
1.1.5.4.
"We Need to Act before the Vested Interests Get Their Vests On"
15
1.1.6.
Negotiation of GATT
16
1.1.7.
Entry into Force
18
1.1.8.
Property Rights on GATT
19
1.1.9.
People Who Made GATT Happen
20
1.2.
Why GATT?
20
1.2.1.
What Did Negotiators Have in Mind?
20
1.2.2.
Economic Theory
23
1.2.2.1.
Gains from Liberalization
23
1.2.2.2.
No Gain without Pain: The Case for Trade Agreements
26
1.2.3.
Economics Meets the Negotiating Record
34
1.3.
(Trans-)Formative Years: GATT in the GATT Era
36
1.3.1.
Flexibility Required: Grandfathering and the Existing Legislation Clause
36
1.3.2.
GATT Recipe for Trade Liberalization
37
1.3.2.1.
Tariffs and... Supporting Act
40
1.3.2.2.
Embedded Liberalism
41
1.3.3.
Becoming an Institution
42
1.3.3.1.
Goodbye, ITO
42
1.3.3.2.
Functional Institutionalism a la GATT
43
1.3.4.
GATT Rounds of Trade Liberalization
49
1.3.4.1.
Bringing Tariffs Down
49
1.3.4.2.
Adding to the Legislative Framework
52
1.3.5.
Transformations of GATT
57
1.3.6.
Brief Appraisal of the GATT Record
57
1.3.7.
Few Good Men
59
1.3.8.
Gentlemen's Club
60
1.4.
Regulation of Trade in Goods in the WTO Era
60
1.4.1.
"Old" and the "New" GATT: GATT 1947, GATT 1994
61
1.4.2.
Relationship between GATT and the Other Annex IA Agreements
63
1.4.3.
Plurilateral Agreements
64
1.4.4.
Single Undertaking Versus "Clubs"
65
1.4.5.
Protocols of Accession
67
1.4.6.
WTO Organs Administering Agreements on Trade in Goods
69
2.
Quantitative Restrictions
73
2.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
73
2.1.1.
Legal Discipline
73
2.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
73
2.1.3.
Discussion
73
2.1.3.1.
Negotiating History
73
2.1.3.2.
Economics of QRs
75
2.2.
Coverage of the Legal Discipline
76
2.2.1.
General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
76
2.2.2.
Quotas
78
2.2.3.
Import and Export Licenses
79
2.2.3.1.
Import Licensing
79
2.2.3.2.
Export Licensing
81
2.2.4.
Other Measures
82
2.2.4.1.
De Facto Export Quotas
82
2.2.4.2.
Minimum Import Prices
83
2.2.4.3.
Minimum Export Prices
84
2.2.4.4.
Trade Balancing Condition
84
2.2.4.5.
Local Content
84
2.2.4.6.
Irrevocable Capital Contribution (Investment)
85
2.2.4.7.
Prohibition to Repatriate Profits
85
2.2.4.8.
Trading Rights in China
85
2.2.5.
Measures Not Covered
86
2.2.5.1.
Customs Duties and Charges
87
2.2.5.2.
Export Taxes
87
2.2.5.3.
Production Quotas
89
2.2.5.4.
Tariff Quotas
90
2.2.5.5.
Trade in Textiles
91
2.2.6.
Attributing QRs to WTO Members
91
2.2.6.1.
No Need to Coerce
91
2.2.6.2.
Export Cartels
93
2.2.7.
Standard of Review
94
2.2.7.1.
Issue
94
2.2.7.2.
Origin of the Problem
95
2.2.7.3.
Breaking with the Past?
96
2.2.8.
Relationship with Article III of GATT
99
2.2.9.
Relationship with Article VIII of GATT
100
2.3.
Exceptions
100
2.3.1.
Critical Shortages
100
2.3.1.1.
Essential Products
101
2.3.1.2.
Foodstuff or "Other Products"
101
2.3.1.3.
Temporarily Applied
102
2.3.1.4.
Burden of Proof
102
2.3.2.
Standards for Classification, Grading, or Marketing of Commodities
104
2.3.2.1.
Key Terms
104
2.3.2.2.
Burden of Proof
104
2.3.3.
QRs Necessary for Enforcing Governmental Measures
105
2.3.3.1.
Test
105
2.3.3.2.
Rationale
105
2.3.3.3.
What Is a Governmental Measure?
106
2.3.3.4.
Product Coverage
108
2.3.3.5.
Restrictions on Like or Substitutable Domestic Goods
108
2.3.3.6.
Temporary Surplus
110
2.3.3.7.
Compensation
111
2.3.3.8.
Public Notice
111
2.3.3.9.
Burden of Proof
111
2.3.4.
Balance of Payments (Articles XII and XVIII of GATT)
111
2.3.4.1.
Rationale
111
2.3.4.2.
Procedural and Institutional Issues
112
2.3.4.3.
Typology of Measures Adopted
113
2.3.4.4.
Invocations
114
2.3.4.5.
Dispute Settlement and Internal and External Institutional Balance
115
2.3.4.6.
Burden of Proof
120
2.3.5.
Exchange Restrictions
121
2.3.5.1.
Global Coherence
121
2.3.5.2.
Currency Manipulations
122
2.3.5.3.
Dispute Settlement
124
2.3.5.4.
Burden of Proof
125
2.3.6.
Infant Industry Protection
125
2.3.6.1.
Rationale
125
2.3.6.2.
Dispute Settlement
125
2.3.6.3.
Burden of Proof
126
2.3.7.
General Exceptions (Article XX of GATT)
126
2.3.8.
National Security (Article XXI of GATT)
126
2.3.9.
Safeguards (Article XIX of GATT)
126
2.3.10.
Can QRs Be Permissible in Order to Avoid Dumping?
126
2.4.
Applying QRs
127
2.4.1.
Nondiscrimination, in Principle
127
2.4.2.
Nondiscrimination, in Practice
128
2.4.2.1.
Global Quotas
128
2.4.2.2.
Origin-Specific Quotas: Historical Shares
128
2.4.2.3.
Licenses/Permits without Quotas
129
2.4.3.
Discriminatory QRs
130
2.4.4.
Import Licensing in the WTO Era
130
2.5.
Institutional Issues
130
2.5.1.
Committee on Market Access
130
2.5.2.
Transparency
130
2.6.
Concluding Remarks
131
3.
Tariffs
133
3.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
133
3.1.1.
Legal Discipline
133
3.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
133
3.1.3.
Discussion
134
3.1.3.1.
First Tariff Negotiations
134
3.1.3.2.
Economics of Tariffs
135
3.1.3.3.
Rationale for Tariffs
135
3.1.3.4.
Tariff Ceilings and Rigid Tariffs
136
3.2.
Expressing Goods in a Common Language
136
3.2.1.
Harmonized System
137
3.2.1.1.
Need for Common Language
137
3.2.1.2.
History of Goods Classification
138
3.2.1.3.
What Does the HS Do?
138
3.2.1.4.
How Common Is Common Language?
142
3.2.1.5.
Dispute Settlement Regarding Classification
143
3.3.
Types of Duties Bound
145
3.3.1.
Reciprocity
145
3.3.2.
OCDs and ODCs: Different Yes, but How?
148
3.3.3.
What Is an Ordinary Customs Duty?
148
3.3.4.
What Is an Other Duty or Charge?
150
3.3.5.
Terms, Conditions, and Qualifications
151
3.3.6.
Consolidating Nontariff Barriers
152
3.4.
Forum for Tariff Concessions
152
3.4.1.
"Usual" Forum for Binding Duties: Trade Rounds
153
3.4.1.1.
Trade Rounds, a Public Good
153
3.4.1.2.
Request[—]Offer
154
3.4.1.3.
Linear Reductions
155
3.4.1.4.
Harmonized Formula
155
3.4.1.5.
Tiered Cuts
155
3.4.1.6.
Terms of Trade and Tariff-Cutting Techniques
155
3.4.2.
Sectoral Agreements
156
3.4.2.1.
Distinguishing Sectoral from Critical Mass Agreements
156
3.4.2.2.
Identity of Sectoral Agreements
157
3.4.3.
Information Technology Agreement (ITA)
158
3.4.3.1.
Why Critical Mass?
158
3.4.3.2.
Negotiation
159
3.4.3.3.
Dispute Settlement
159
3.4.3.4.
ITA I and II
161
3.4.4.
Pharma Agreement
162
3.4.5.
Coalitions
162
3.4.6.
Unilateral Action
163
3.5.
Schedules of Concession
164
3.5.1.
Certification, Rectification, and Modification of Schedules
164
3.5.1.1.
Centralized Process
164
3.5.1.2.
Certification Does Not Confer Legality
165
3.5.1.3.
Uncertified Actions
167
3.5.2.
Content and Legal Value of Schedules of Concessions
169
3.5.3.
Defining the Tariff Value: Customs Valuation
170
3.6.
Safeguarding the Value of Tariff Concessions
171
3.6.1.
Change in the Method of Determining Dutiable Value
171
3.6.2.
Import Monopolies
171
3.6.3.
Disputes Regarding the Proper Classification of Goods
173
3.6.4.
Reduction in Par Values
173
3.7.
Renegotiation of Tariff Protection
174
3.7.1.
Maintaining the Level of Concessions
175
3.7.2.
Participants
176
3.7.2.1.
INR Holders
177
3.7.2.2.
PSI Countries
178
3.7.2.3.
SI Countries
180
3.7.3.
Various Procedures for Renegotiating Tariff Protection
181
3.7.4.
Agreement on the Amount of Compensation
182
3.7.5.
Failure to Agree on the Amount of Compensation
183
3.7.5.1.
Procedures Where No Prior Approval Is Required
183
3.7.5.2.
Procedures Where Prior Approval Is Required
186
3.8.
Charges Exempted from Article II of GATT
187
3.8.1.
Internal Taxes and Charges
187
3.8.2.
Antidumping and Countervailing Duties
188
3.8.3.
Fees and Charges for Services Rendered
188
3.8.3.1.
Preparatory Work
188
3.8.3.2.
Relationship with Article II of GATT
189
3.8.3.3.
Measures Covered
189
3.8.3.4.
Standard of Review
190
3.8.4.
Import Surcharges for BoP Reasons
190
3.8.5.
Safeguards
190
3.9.
Withdrawal from GATT/WTO
191
3.9.1.
Withdrawing from the WTO
191
3.9.2.
GATT Solution
191
3.9.3.
GATT Practice
192
3.10.
Exceptions
193
3.11.
Institutions
194
3.12.
Concluding Remarks
194
4.
Most Favored Nation
195
4.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
195
4.1.1.
Legal Discipline
195
4.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
195
4.1.3.
Discussion
196
4.1.3.1.
Historic Dimension of MFN
196
4.1.3.2.
MFN at the GATT Negotiating Table
196
4.1.3.3.
MEN at the GATT Negotiating Table: The Economics of MFN
197
4.1.3.4.
MFN and Preferential Trade
199
4.2.
Coverage of the Legal Discipline
200
4.2.1.
De Jure versus De Facto Discrimination
200
4.2.2.
Measures Covered: Any "Advantage," "Favor," Etc.
201
4.2.2.1.
Customs Duties and Charges of Any Kind
202
4.2.2.2.
Methods for Calculating the Level of Duties and Charges
203
4.2.2.3.
Rules and Formalities
203
4.2.2.4.
Internal Measures
204
4.3.
Exemptions
204
4.3.1.
Grandfathering Imperial Preferences
204
4.3.2.
Other Historical Preferences
205
4.3.3.
Imperial and Historical Preferences Today
205
4.4.
WTO "Club" Must Receive the Best Treatment
206
4.4.1.
WTO Members versus the Rest of the World
206
4.4.2.
As Membership Increases, So Does the Impact of MFN
206
4.5.
Favors/Advantages Must Be Accorded Immediately and Unconditionally
206
4.5.1.
Immediately
207
4.5.2.
Unconditionally
207
4.5.2.1.
US Attitude toward Conditional and Unconditional MFN
207
4.5.2.2.
"Unconditionally" in Case Law
209
4.6.
Defining Origin
214
4.6.1.
Pre-GATT Years
216
4.6.2.
GATT Regime
217
4.6.2.1.
Article VIII of GA77'
217
4.6.2.2.
Marks of Origin
217
4.6.2.3.
False Origin: A Deceptive Practice
220
4.6.2.4.
Efforts to Harmonize
220
4.6.3.
WTO Regime
223
4.6.3.1.
Agreement to Disagree
224
4.6.3.2.
MFN In, Preferential Rules of Origin Out
225
4.6.4.
Preferential Rules of Origin
227
4.6.4.1.
Out of HWP, Out of WTO?
227
4.6.4.2.
Empirical Studies Reveal a Mess
228
4.6.4.3.
Cumulation
229
4.6.4.4.
Complying with Complicated Rules
230
4.6.4.5.
Utilization Rate
231
4.6.4.6.
Rules of Origin for LDCs
232
4.6.4.7.
If No Negotiations, Then What?
232
4.6.5.
Rise of Global Value Chains (GVCs)
233
4.7.
Like Products
235
4.7.1.
Like Products and Beggar-Thy-Neighbor Policies
235
4.7.2.
Tariff Classification: The Dominant Criterion
235
4.8.
Exceptions
238
4.8.1.
Special and Differential Treatment
238
4.8.2.
PTAs
238
4.8.3.
General Exceptions
238
4.8.4.
National Security
238
4.8.5.
Waivers
238
4.8.6.
Nonapplication
239
4.9.
Concluding Remarks
239
5.
Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries
241
5.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
241
5.1.1.
Legal Discipline
241
5.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
241
5.1.3.
Discussion
242
5.1.3.1.
MFN between Unequal Partners
242
5.1.3.2.
Background: Gottfried Haberler versus Singer/Prebisch
243
5.1.3.3.
Import Substitution
245
5.2.
Toward Special and Differential Treatment
246
5.2.1.
Striving for a Two-Tier GATT
246
5.2.2.
Content of Part IV
246
5.2.2.1.
Principles and Objectives
247
5.2.2.2.
Commitments
247
5.2.2.3.
Joint Action
248
5.3.
Enabling Clause Enters the Frame
248
5.3.1.
Atypical Birth
248
5.3.2.
Main Features of the Enabling Clause
249
5.3.3.
Legal Nature of the Enabling Clause
250
5.3.4.
Donors and Beneficiaries
250
5.3.4.1.
No Obligation to Donate
250
5.3.4.2.
Self-Selection of Beneficiaries
250
5.3.4.3.
Graduation
253
5.3.5.
GSP Schemes
253
5.3.5.1.
Basic Obligation
253
5.3.5.2.
Preferences Requiring a Waiver
254
5.3.5.3.
Preferences for LDCs
254
5.3.5.4.
Preferences for Developing Countries
262
5.3.5.5.
Additional Preferences for Developing Countries
262
5.3.5.6.
Excluding Beneficiaries
265
5.3.5.7.
Evaluating the GSP Schemes: Is the Candle Worth the Flame?
266
5.3.6.
South-South Preferences
271
5.3.6.1.
Tariff Preferences
271
5.3.6.2.
PTAs between Developing Countries
271
5.4.
Special and Differential Treatment Other Than GSP
273
5.4.1.
Typology
273
5.4.2.
Transparency Mechanism for Preferential Trade Advantages
274
5.5.
Wider Picture: Trade and Development
276
5.5.1.
Early Years
276
5.5.2.
DDA
277
5.5.2.1.
Mandate (and Its Caveats)
277
5.5.2.2.
Capacity Building
278
5.5.2.3.
Cooperation with Other Institutions
278
5.5.2.4.
Action for LDCs
279
5.5.3.
Aid for Trade: Integrated, Not Simply Involved
282
5.5.3.1.
Jewel of the DDA
282
5.5.3.2.
Capacity Building in Aid for Trade
283
5.5.3.3.
Infrastructure
283
5.5.3.4.
Increased Productivity
283
5.5.3.5.
Adjustment Assistance
283
5.5.3.6.
WTO's Involvement
284
5.5.3.7.
Aid for Trade: Early Evaluations
284
5.5.4.
Trade, Poverty, and Inequality
285
5.5.4.1.
Why the Question?
285
5.5.4.2.
Trade and Poverty
286
5.5.4.3.
Trade and Inequality
286
5.6.
Institutions
287
5.7.
Concluding Remarks
288
6.
Preferential Trade Agreements
291
6.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
291
6.1.1.
Legal Discipline
291
6.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
291
6.1.2.1.
Frontier Traffic
292
6.1.2.2.
Preexisting Arrangements
293
6.1.2.3.
Development Tool
293
6.1.2.4.
Insurance Policy
293
6.1.2.5.
US-Canada Rapprochement
293
6.1.3.
Discussion
294
6.1.3.1.
PTAs and MFN
294
6.1.3.2.
FTAs, CUs, and Beyond
294
6.2.
Why Go Preferential?
295
6.3.
Legal Requirements for GATT-Consistent PTAs
299
6.3.1.
Exception to MFN
300
6.3.2.
Notification Requirements
300
6.3.2.1.
Who Notifies?
300
6.3.2.2.
Notify Whom?
302
6.3.2.3.
Notify What?
302
6.3.2.4.
Notify When?
302
6.3.3.
Internal Requirement: Eliminate Duties with Respect to Substantially All Trade
304
6.3.3.1.
Same Requirement for FTAs and CUs
304
6.3.3.2.
Substantially All Trade (SAT)
304
6.3.3.3.
Duties and Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce
305
6.3.4.
External Requirement: No New Protection
307
6.3.4.1.
External Requirement That FTAs Must Meet
307
6.3.4.2.
External Requirement That CUs Must Meet
308
6.3.5.
Nature of Review
311
6.3.5.1.
Merger Authority, in Principle
311
6.3.5.2.
Switch in Focus: The Transparency Mechanism
312
6.4.
Litigating PTAs
313
6.4.1.
Litigation in the GATT Era
313
6.4.2.
Litigation in the WTO Era
315
6.4.2.1.
Institutional Balance: Things Have Changed?
315
6.4.2.2.
Ambit of Judicial Review
317
6.4.3.
Why So Little Litigation?
319
6.4.3.1.
Original Sin
319
6.4.3.2.
Other Plausible Explanations
320
6.4.4.
Is De Facto Tolerance of PTAs an Issue?
322
6.5.
Institutions
333
6.6.
Concluding Remarks
333
7.
Domestic Policies/National Treatment
335
7.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
335
7.1.1.
Legal Discipline
335
7.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
336
7.1.3.
Discussion
337
7.1.3.1.
Impact of the PPA
337
7.1.3.2.
NT Concession Erosion, and Uncertainty
337
7.1.3.3.
Contract Incompleteness
338
7.1.3.4.
Reciprocity
340
7.1.3.5.
Shallow Integration and Deep Integration
340
7.2.
Measures Coming under the Purview of Article III of GATT
341
7.2.1.
Local Content Requirements
341
7.2.2.
All Other Measures Affecting Trade
342
7.3.
Measures Exempted
343
7.3.1.
Government Procurement
343
7.3.2.
Subsidies
346
7.3.3.
Film Quotas
346
7.3.3.1.
Negotiating History
346
7.3.3.2.
Film Quotas in the W7'0 World
347
7.3.3.3.
Distinguishing GATT from GATS: A Line in the Sand?
349
7.3.3.4.
CATS before GATT
351
7.3.4.
Income Taxes, Social Security, and Payroll Taxes
353
7.3.4.1.
WP on BTA
353
7.3.4.2.
Outcome
356
7.3.4.3.
Legal Value of the Report
358
7.3.5.
Investment Protection
358
7.3.6.
Goods in Transit
359
7.4.
Scope of National Treatment
361
7.4.1.
De Jure, De Facto Discrimination
361
7.4.2.
Duties Bound and Unbound
362
7.4.3.
Domestic Measures Enforced at the Border
363
7.4.4.
Jurisdictional Issues
364
7.5.
Direct Taxes on Products
365
7.5.1.
DCS Products
366
7.5.1.1.
Why Include DCS Products?
366
7.5.1.2.
Defining DCS Products
368
7.5.1.3.
From Extant to Latent Demand
370
7.5.1.4.
Applied So As to ASATAP
371
7.5.2.
Like Products
376
7.5.2.1.
Like Products: The Definition
376
7.5.2.2.
Taxation in Excess
379
7.6.
Other Measures Affecting Trade
380
7.6.1.
Laws, Regulations, or Requirements
381
7.6.2.
Affecting Sale, Offering for Sale
382
7.6.3.
Like Products in Article 111.4 of GATT
382
7.6.4.
Less Favorable Treatment (LFT)
385
7.6.4.1.
LFT Means No Protectionism
385
7.6.4.2.
De Jure and De Facto LFT
385
7.6.4.3.
Trouble in Korea
386
7.6.4.4.
Sultans of Swing I (Dominican Republic[—]Import and Sale of Cigarettes)
389
7.6.4.5.
Sultans of Swing II (EC[—]Seal Products)
390
7.6.4.6.
Swinging in Echternach
391
7.7.
Exceptions
392
7.8.
Institutions
392
7.9.
Concluding Remarks
392
7.9.1.
Nondiscrimination and Efficiency
392
7.9.2.
Asymmetric Information and Its Discontents
393
7.9.3.
In Search of a Smoking Gun
395
7.9.3.1.
Origin Neutrality
397
7.9.3.2.
Use of the First-Best Instrument
397
7.9.3.3.
Scientific Evidence
397
7.9.3.4.
Necessity
397
7.9.3.5.
Who Bears Adjustment Costs?
397
7.9.3.6.
Consistency
397
7.9.3.7.
International Standards
397
8.
State Trading Enterprises
399
8.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
399
8.1.1.
Legal Discipline
399
8.1.2.
Rationale for the Legal Discipline
399
8.1.3.
Discussion
400
8.1.3.1.
Negotiating Record
400
8.1.3.2.
Subsequent Practice
402
8.2.
Defining STEs
402
8.2.1.
Law
403
8.2.2.
Practice
404
8.3.
Obligations Assumed
405
8.3.1.
Nondiscrimination
406
8.3.2.
Commercial Considerations
406
8.3.3.
Adequate Opportunities to Compete
410
8.3.4.
Exceptions
411
8.4.
Transparency
411
8.5.
Institutions
412
8.6.
Concluding Remarks
412
9.
Exceptions and Deviations from Obligations Assumed under GATT
413
9.1.
Exceptions and Deviations
413
9.2.
General Exceptions
414
9.2.1.
Legal Discipline and Its Rationale
414
9.2.2.
Elements Common to All Listed Exceptions
417
9.2.2.1.
Two-Tier Test
421
9.2.2.2.
Burden of Proof
422
9.2.2.3.
Means Are Justiciable, not Ends
422
9.2.2.4.
Pursuing Multiple Means and Ends (What Is a "Measure"?)
423
9.2.3.
Public Morals
427
9.2.3.1.
Scope of Public Morals
427
9.2.3.2.
Necessary to Protect Public Morals
430
9.2.4.
Humans, Animals, Plant Life, and Health
430
9.2.4.1.
Scope of the Provision
430
9.2.4.2.
Necessity
430
9.2.5.
Imports and Exports of Gold and Silver
441
9.2.6.
Compliance with Laws Not Inconsistent with GATT
442
9.2.6.1.
Scope of the Provision
442
9.2.6.2.
Test for Compliance
443
9.2.7.
Prison Labor
443
9.2.8.
National Treasures
444
9.2.9.
Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources
444
9.2.9.1.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
445
9.2.9.2.
Jurisdiction
446
9.2.9.3.
Exhaustible Natural Resources
447
9.2.9.4.
Exhaustible Natural Resources and Endangered Species
450
9.2.9.5.
Conservation Policies
450
9.2.9.6.
Relating To
451
9.2.9.7.
Proximate and Ultimate Cause
453
9.2.9.8.
In Conjunction with Domestic Consumption or Production
454
9.2.9.9.
Incidence of the Level of Development
456
9.2.10.
Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements (ICAs)
456
9.2.10.1.
Function of Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements
456
9.2.10.2.
ECOSOC Resolution 30(IV)
457
9.2.11.
Government Stabilization Plans
458
9.2.12.
Products in General or Local Short Supply
459
9.2.13.
Complying with the Chapeau
460
9.2.13.1.
Application, Not Substantive Consistency
460
9.2.13.2.
Application? Not Substantive Consistency?
461
9.2.13.3.
Arbitrary Discrimination, Unjustifiable Discrimination, Disguised Restriction
462
9.2.13.4.
No Effects Test Required
468
9.2.14.
Article XX of GATT and Protocols of Accession
469
9.2.14.1.
Test
469
9.2.14.2.
Cases Where the Defense Is Available
471
9.2.14.3.
Cases Where the Defense Is Unavailable
471