European federal criminal law : the federal dimension of EU criminal law / Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez.
2015
KJE7975 .G66 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Title
European federal criminal law : the federal dimension of EU criminal law / Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez.
Published
Cambridge ; Antwerp ; Portland : Intersentia, [2015]
Copyright
©2015
Call Number
KJE7975 .G66 2015
ISBN
9781780681207
1780681208
1780681208
Description
xxi, 256 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)828187162
Summary
For decades, the EU has developed a system of criminal justice consistent with the mixed (sometimes contradictory) tendencies embedded in its very own structure. The Lisbon Treaty consolidated some federal elements that have an impact on the future development of this area of law. The sovereign debt crisis of 2010 and its progeny have, if anything, consolidated the need for the federal protection of EU financial interests at the EU level. This book aims to provide new insights in the federal dimension of these developments. Beginning with an analysis of the current state of affairs, the book also tackles the federalizing elements contained in such issues as the creation of a European banking supervision authority, the establishment of the European Prosecutor Office or the enactment of a EU regulation containing the grounds rules of its functioning. Throughout the chapters the reader will find constant references to the most efficient system of federal criminal law, i.e. the US system.
Note
For decades, the EU has developed a system of criminal justice consistent with the mixed (sometimes contradictory) tendencies embedded in its very own structure. The Lisbon Treaty consolidated some federal elements that have an impact on the future development of this area of law. The sovereign debt crisis of 2010 and its progeny have, if anything, consolidated the need for the federal protection of EU financial interests at the EU level. This book aims to provide new insights in the federal dimension of these developments. Beginning with an analysis of the current state of affairs, the book also tackles the federalizing elements contained in such issues as the creation of a European banking supervision authority, the establishment of the European Prosecutor Office or the enactment of a EU regulation containing the grounds rules of its functioning. Throughout the chapters the reader will find constant references to the most efficient system of federal criminal law, i.e. the US system.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Preface
vii
Acknowledgements
xi
Findings
xix
Introduction
1
1.
Why the Comparison with the US System of Federal Criminal Law?
5
2.
Some Notes on American Federalism
8
3.
Structure of this Book
10
ch. 1
EU Criminal Law Situation Prior to the Lisbon Treaty
13
1.
Introduction
13
2.
Preliminary Issues
15
2.1.
Vertical and Horizontal Federalism in Both Unions
15
2.2.
EU Criminal Law, Europeanized Criminal Law and European Criminal Law: ante portas or intra muros?
18
2.3.
Conclusion
19
4.
Crime Policy
19
4.1.
Introduction
19
4.2.
European Criminal Policy
20
4.3.
Federal Crime Policy in the US System
23
4.4.
Conclusion
26
5.
Criminal Law Scholarship
26
5.1.
EU Criminal Law Scholarship
26
5.2.
US Federal Criminal Law Scholarship
30
5.3.
Conclusion
34
6.
Fundamentals of European Horizontal Federal Criminal Law: The Principle of Mutual Recognition
34
6.1.
Introduction
34
6.2.
Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to the Field of Criminal Law
35
6.2.1.
Introduction
35
6.2.2.
Criticisms Generated by the Transplantation of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to the Criminal Law Field
38
6.2.3.
Responses to the Critics
42
6.2.4.
It Had It Coming: The Ruling of the German Constitutional Court on 18 July 2005
44
6.2.5.
Timid ECJ Response: Advocaten voor der Wereld (2007)
46
6.3.
Full Faith and Credit Clause in the US System: A Valid Comparison?
47
6.3.1.
Introduction
47
6.3.2.
Rules and the Exceptions to Full Faith and Credit
48
6.3.3.
Full Faith and Credit in Criminal Matters?
51
6.3.4.
Conclusion
53
ch. 2
Federal Criminal Law Dimension in the Lisbon Treaty
55
1.
Introduction
55
2.
Preliminary Issues
60
2.1.
How Many Different Sources of Criminal Powers Are There in Both Unions?
60
2.2.
Federal Courts in Both Unions
64
3.
First Federal Dimension of the Unions' Criminal Law: Crimes Affecting the Unions' Interests
74
3.1.
Introduction
74
3.2.
Protection of the EU's Financial Interests (Article 325 TFEU)
76
3.3.
Protection of Direct Federal Interests in the US Constitution (Article I Section 8)
85
4.
Second Federal Dimension of the Unions' Criminal Law: Interstate Criminality and the Enforcement of the Unions' Policies
90
4.1.
Introduction
90
4.2.
Criteria for Federalizing Crimes in the EU (Horizontally) and in the US (Vertically)
91
4.2.1.
Introduction
91
4.2.2.
Criteria for the Inclusion of Matters within the Area of Liberty, Security and Justice of the EU
93
4.2.3.
Federalization of Crime in the US
96
4.3.
Interstate Criminality
100
4.3.1.
Introduction
100
4.3.2.
EU's Serious Cross-Border Criminality (Article 83(1) TFEU)
101
4.3.2.1.
Catalog of (Vertical) Federal Crimes Specified in Article 83(1) TFEU (EU)
101
4.3.2.2.
Open-Ended Nature of the Catalog (Article 83(1) TFEU in fine)
105
4.3.3.
US's Criminality Affecting Interstate Commerce
108
4.3.3.1.
Catalog of (Horizontal) Federal Crimes Specified in Title 18 of the U.S.C. (US)
108
4.3.3.2.
Open-Ended Nature of the Catalog: the Commerce Clause and Federal Criminal Law
109
4.4.
Enforcement of Unions' Policies
115
4.4.1.
Introduction
115
4.4.2.
Effective Implementation of an EU Policy (Article 83(2) TFEU)
116
4.4.3.
Necessary and Proper Clause in the US Constitution
121
5.
Enforcement Federal Dimension in the Unions' Criminal Law
128
5.1.
Introduction
128
5.2.
European Public Prosecutor's Office (Article 86 TFEU): From Horizontal to Vertical Federalism?
129
5.3.
Federal Prosecutors in the US: The Raw Discretionary Power
132
ch. 3
Testing the Alleged Lack of Federalism
137
1.
Introduction
137
2.
Interstate Extradition
138
2.1.
Introduction
138
2.2.
European Arrest Warrant (EU)
139
2.3.
Interstate Rendition (US)
144
2.4.
Comparison
148
3.
Double Jeopardy
149
3.1.
Introduction
149
3.2.
Article 54 Schengen Agreement and ne bis in idem (EU)
150
3.3.
Double Jeopardy and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine (US)
155
3.4.
Comparison
160
4.
Criminal Law Harmonization
161
4.1.
Introduction
161
4.2.
Mandatory Harmonization (EU): European Directives
162
4.3.
Voluntary Harmonization (US): Interstate Compacts and Uniform State Law
165
4.4.
Comparison
172
ch. 4
Federal Dimension of Fundamental Rights
175
1.
Introduction
175
2.
Bill of Rights and the Incorporation Debate (US)
177
2.1.
Introduction
177
2.2.
Background Concepts
177
2.3.
Evolution of Incorporation
179
3.
Growth of European Due Process
182
3.1.
Due Process from the ECJ and the ECHR
182
3.2.
Specific European Due Process Rights
187
4.
Comparing Systems
190
4.1.
Evolving Standards and Judicial Activism
190
4.2.
Federal/"Federal" Relationships
192
4.3.
Greater European Federalism: Maximum Standards
196
5.
Other Criminal Procedure Harmonization
197
5.1.
Introduction
197
5.2.
EU Roadmap on Procedural Rights
197
5.3.
(Lack of) Sub-Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the US
198
6.
Conclusion
199
7.
Case Study: European Due Process in Action: The Case of Spanish Secrecy Court Proceedings
202
7.1.
Introduction
202
7.2.
Spanish Secrecy Proceedings
203
7.3.
European Due Process and Secrecy Proceedings
204
7.4.
Right to Information in Article 6(3)(a) ECHR
206
7.4.1.
Information for the Preparation of Defense
207
7.4.2.
Article 6(3)(a) ECHR in the Context of Secrecy Proceedings
208
7.5.
Trial within a Reasonable Time in Article 6 ECHR
210
7.5.1.
Length of Proceedings: the Law
211
7.5.1.1.
Beginning of the "Reasonable Time" Measure
211
7.5.1.2.
Factors Considered by the Court
212
7.5.2.
Length of Proceedings in the Context of Secrecy Proceedings
213
7.6.
Conclusion
214
ch. 5
Sovereign Debt Crisis and the Future of EU Criminal Law
217
1.
Introduction
217
2.
United States versus Europe: Different Approaches to the Same Problem?
218
2.1.
Financial Markets' Pressure
220
2.2.
European Approach
222
2.3.
American Approach
223
2.4.
Future Ahead
224
3.
Recent Developments in the EU Approach
225
3.1.
Safeguarding Taxpayers' Money?
225
3.2.
So-Called Anti-Fraud Strategy
226
3.3.
Towards an EU Criminal Policy
228
3.4.
Will this Well-Intended Language Suffice?
229
4.
First Benchmark: The Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation -- Financial Markets and the Stability of the EU
231
5.
Second Benchmark: The Proposal for a Directive to Protect European Financial Interests through Criminal Law -- Genuine EU Interests
234
6.
Third Benchmark: The European Prosecutor Office --"Blue Helmets" in the War against Crime?
236
7.
ESMA Case: A Prequel in Terms of Questioning Enforcement Powers?
241
8.
Law Enforcement and Investors Rationality: Some Lessons from the Law and Finance Debate
245
9.
Current Greek Crisis: Would it Look Different with an Independent EPPO Effectively Enforcing the Protection of the EU Financial Interests?
248
10.
Proposed System of EU Criminal Law: The Balance between Vertical and Horizontal Federalism
249
10.1.
Introduction
249
10.2.
Enhancing the Vertical Federalism Dimension
250
10.2.1.
Rethinking the Model: Towards an EU Competition Law Model with the Necessary Checks and Balances
250
10.2.2.
Regulation Protecting EU Financial Interests through Criminal Law
252
10.2.3.
Regulation Introducing European Rules of Criminal Procedure
253
10.2.4.
EPPO: Single-Hat Prosecutors
253
10.2.5.
Eurojust: Coordination between EPPO and National Enforcement Authorities
254
10.2.6.
Role of National Prosecutors: Assisting the EPPO
254
10.2.7.
OLAF: The European FBI
254
10.2.8.
Role of National Courts: Creating Specialized Courts to Authorize Measures Affecting Fundamental Rights and to Try EPPO Cases
255
10.2.9.
Judicial Review before the ECJ: Article 257 TFEU to Review the Decision to Proceed to Trial and to Review the Convictions
255