Crafting courts in new democracies : the politics of subnational judicial reform in Brazil and Mexico / Matthew C. Ingram.
2016
KG497 .I54 2015 (Map It)
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Details
Author
Title
Crafting courts in new democracies : the politics of subnational judicial reform in Brazil and Mexico / Matthew C. Ingram.
Published
New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Copyright
©2016
Call Number
KG497 .I54 2015
Former Call Number
Mex 710 In47 2015
ISBN
9781107117327 (hardback)
1107117321 (hardback)
1107117321 (hardback)
Description
xxv, 365 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)907931445
Summary
"In Crafting Courts in New Democracies Matthew C. Ingram fills this gap by examining the varying strength of local judicial institutions in Brazil and Mexico since the 1980s. Combining statistical analysis and in-depth qualitative research, Ingram offers a rich account of the politics that shape subnational court reform in the region's two largest democracies. In contrast to previous studies, theoretical emphasis is given to the influence of political ideas over the traditional focus on objective, material incentives"-- Provided by publisher.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references (pages 331-362) and index.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
Figures
xiii
Tables
xv
Preface
xvii
Acknowledgments
xix
1.
Judicial Reform in New Democracies
1
Argument
3
Broader Overview
5
Empirical Problems
5
Theoretical Puzzles
11
Conceptual Clarification: Court Strength in the Mexican and Brazilian States
13
Understanding Reform Options within Landscape of Institutions and Ideas
15
Institutional Landscape
15
Agendas of Judicial Reform: Policy Options in Circulation, 1985-2005
24
Ideational Landscape
31
Country Selection, Boundary Conditions, and Interactions
41
Country Selection
41
Boundary Conditions
43
Interactions
49
Plan of the Book
51
Part I: Theory and Methods
2.
Ideas, Interests, and Judicial Institutions
57
Why Build Strong Courts?
57
Non-Methodological Challenge in the Study of Ideas
59
Methodological Challenges in the Study of Ideas
60
Conceptualizing Ideas: Programmatic Commitments
61
Measurement of Ideas
65
Empirical Implications of Ideational Arguments
66
Testing the Argument
67
Ideational Argument: The Causal Role of Programmatic Commitments
68
Empirical Implications
74
What Are the Origins of Ideas?
76
Alternative Explanations: Rational-Strategic Accounts
78
Overview of Causal Logics behind Rational-Strategic Argument
79
Positive Consequences of Electoral Competition
81
Reelection Logic
81
Signaling (or Strategic Bargaining) Logic
83
Insurance Logics
84
Governance Logic
93
Negative Consequences of Electoral Competition
93
Government-Opposition Dynamics
94
Territorial Interests
95
Conclusion: Reprising Strengths of Ideational Argument
97
3.
Methods
100
Introduction
100
Subnational Research: Leveraging Strengths, Overcoming Weaknesses
102
Multi-Method Research: Integrating Quantitative and Qualitative Methods
111
Large-N Method: Time-Series Cross-Section (TSCS) Analysis
112
Case Selection: Nested Analysis
115
Small-N Method: Theory-Guided Process Tracing
132
Conclusion
136
Part II: Empirical Analysis
Introduction
139
Judicial Spending and Court Strength
140
4.
Large-N Analysis in Mexico (1993-2009)
147
Introduction
147
Judicial Spending in the Mexican States
147
Measuring Programmatic Commitments and Electoral Competition in Mexico
149
Data and Methods
152
Data
152
Methods
153
Results
154
Discussion
159
Conclusion
162
5.
Large-N Analysis in Brazil (1985-2006)
164
Introduction
164
Judicial Spending in the Brazilian States
165
Measuring Programmatic Commitments and Electoral Competition in Brazil
167
Data and Methods
170
Data
170
Methods
172
Results
172
Controlling for Political Stability or Institutionalization
174
Examining Individual Party Effects
181
Left Successors and Right Successors
183
Discussion
185
Conclusion
190
6.
Small-N Analysis in Mexico: Aguascalientes, Michoacán, and Hidalgo
192
Introduction
193
Measuring Judicial Strength in Three Mexican States
196
Judicial Spending
199
Institutional Design
201
Career Structure
203
Causal Analysis
205
Courts in Rightward, PRI-to-PAN Transitions
207
Courts in Leftward, PRI-to-PRD Transitions
212
Courts in PRI-Dominated, Authoritarian Enclaves
218
Conclusion
220
7.
Small-N Analysis in Brazil: Acre, Rio Grande do Sul, and Maranhao
224
Introduction
224
Measuring Judicial Strength in Three Brazilian States
229
Judicial Spending
230
Judicial Personnel
235
Infrastructure
235
Causal Analysis
235
Courts in New, Leftist Strongholds
236
1995-1996: Corrosive Gains from Within, Progressive Strength from Without
236
2000-2003: Progressive Pressures from Within Meet External Support
241
2006-2007: Deepening Administrative Reforms
252
Courts under Competitive Alternation
253
1989-1992: Positive Change from Within Supported by the Left
253
1999-2002: The Left Clashes with the Court
257
Courts in Traditional, Authoritarian Enclaves
260
CNJ Boomerang
267
Causal Logics Revisited
269
Conclusion
276
Part III: Conclusion
8.
Crafting Courts in New Democracies: Beyond Brazil and Mexico
281
Ideational Origins of Strong State Courts in Mexico and Brazil
281
Implications for Theory Development
284
Revisiting Potential Boundary Conditions: Case Study of Bolivia
286
Clarifying Causal Logics
291
Baseline Strength of Institutions
293
Legacies of Authoritarianism
294
National Institutions, Interdependence, and Policy Movement across Levels of Government
297
Ideas and Epistemic Communities
298
Judge-Led Reforms and Conduct "Beyond the Bench"
299
Policy Implications
300
Coda and Directions for Future Research
301
Appendices
Appendix A: List of Acronyms and Glossary of Legal Terms
307
Appendix B: List of Interviews
315
Appendix C: Auxiliary Tables and Figures for Case Selection
320
Appendix D: Auxiliary GEE Analysis in Brazil Showing Individual Rightist Parties
329
References
331
Index
363