Rule of law and fundamental rights : critical comparative analysis of constitutional review in the United States, Germany and Mexico / Alfredo Narváez Medécigo.
2016
K3175 .N37 2016 (Map It)
Available at Cellar
Formats
Format | |
---|---|
BibTeX | |
MARCXML | |
TextMARC | |
MARC | |
DublinCore | |
EndNote | |
NLM | |
RefWorks | |
RIS |
Items
Details
Title
Rule of law and fundamental rights : critical comparative analysis of constitutional review in the United States, Germany and Mexico / Alfredo Narváez Medécigo.
Published
Cham ; Heidelberg ; New York ; Dordrecht ; London : Springer, [2016]
Copyright
©2016
Call Number
K3175 .N37 2016
ISBN
9783319245614
3319245619
3319245619
Description
xv, 262 pages ; 24 cm
System Control No.
(OCoLC)918594210
Summary
"This book, which originated from the broadly held view that there is a lack of rule-of-law in Mexico, and from the emphasis of traditional academia on cultural elements as the main explanation, explores the question of whether there is any relationship between the system of constitutional review (and thus the 'law' as such) and the level of rule-of-law in a given state. To do so, it elaborates a theoretical model for achieving rule-of-law and compares it to the constitutional review systems of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Mexico. The study concludes that the two former states correspond to the model, while the latter does not. This is fundamentally due to the role each legal system assigns to ordinary jurisdiction in carrying out constitutional review. Whereas the U.S. and Germany have fostered the policy that constitutional review regarding the enforcement of basic rights is the responsibility of ordinary courts, Mexico has relied too heavily on the specialized constitutional jurisdiction"--Back cover.
Bibliography, etc. Note
Includes bibliographical references.
Record Appears in
Table of Contents
1.
General Introduction
1
1.1.
Background: Ineffective Rule-of-Law Reforms in Mexico
1
1.2.
Research Gap: `Culture' as the Miscellaneous Explanation
3
1.3.
Methodology: A Critical Comparative Legal Analysis
5
1.4.
Overview of the Study
7
References
8
2.
Rule-of-Law and Judicial Federalism: The Role of Ordinary Courts in the Enforcement of Fundamental Rights
11
2.1.
Rule-of-Law Concept Revisited: The Rule-of-the-Constitution
13
2.1.1.
Concept Within Two Debates
13
2.1.2.
Matter of Predictability
17
2.1.3.
Constitutional Supremacy and Fundamental Rights
21
2.2.
Constitutional Scrutiny as Judicial Review
24
2.2.1.
Constitutional Review, the Courts, and the Individual
24
2.2.2.
Fundamental Political Decisions and Constitutional Review
28
2.2.3.
Horizontal Separation of Powers and Constitutional (Judicial) Review
32
2.3.
Judicial Review and Judicial Federalism
37
2.3.1.
Vertical Separation of Powers and Judicial Review
37
2.3.2.
"American" Judicial Federalism
39
2.3.3.
"European" Judicial Federalism
42
2.3.4.
Constitutional (Judicial) Review of Judicial Action
45
2.4.
Ordinary Courts and the Realization of Fundamental Rights: Towards an Adequate Functional Division in Constitutional Review
49
2.4.1.
Two Dimensions of Constitutional Scrutiny (Rights)
49
2.4.2.
Towards an Adequate Division of Tasks in Constitutional Scrutiny
54
2.4.3.
Role of Ordinary Courts in Fundamental Rights Issues: The `Direct Effect of the Constitution'
58
2.4.4.
Guiding Role of Constitutional Jurisdiction
60
2.5.
Chapter Conclusions
66
References
67
3.
Constitutional Review in the United States of America: Does "Diffused" Mean Complete Decentralization?
71
3.1.
Basic Rights Enforcement Before the Civil War (1776--1860)
76
3.1.1.
Federal Bill of Rights as a Guarantee for the States
76
3.1.2.
Judicial Enforcement of Fundamental Rights in the Antebellum
87
3.2.
Postwar Increase on Federal Oversight: The Blurring of Boundaries Between State and Federal Jurisdiction (1865--1988)
96
3.2.1.
Reconstruction: The Federal Bill of Rights as a Guarantee Against the States
96
3.2.2.
"Due Process Revolution" and the Maximization of Federal Judicial Power over the States
105
3.3.
American State Courts as Primary Guarantors of Fundamental Rights
116
3.3.1.
Assumption of Judicial Parity and Its Limits: Exclusive Federal Court Jurisdiction
116
3.3.2.
Fostering Federalism: Concurrent Jurisdiction with State Courts
122
3.4.
Guiding Function of the Federal Judicial Review of State Court Judgments
129
3.4.1.
Lower Federal Court Collateral Relief Through Habeas Corpus: A `Right' to Federal Review of a State Court Decision?
129
3.4.2.
Supreme Court Appellate Review via Writ of Certiorari
139
3.5.
Chapter Conclusions
145
References
148
4.
German System of Constitutional Review: Prototype of a Concentrated Model?
155
4.1.
Basic Rights as a Core Element of the German Rechtsstaat
158
4.1.1.
Formal Versus Material Rechtsstaat
158
4.1.2.
Concretizing the `Basic Rights Rechtsstaat'
164
4.2.
Blurring of Boundaries Between Ordinary and Constitutional Judicial Review
170
4.2.1.
Need for a Specialized Constitutional Jurisdiction
170
4.2.2.
Jurisprudential Expansion of the Constitutional Jurisdiction
174
4.3.
Ordinary German Courts as the Main Protectors of Basic Rights
181
4.3.1.
Ordinary Court Empowerment to Review the Constitutionality of Legislation: An Invalidation Monopoly?
181
4.3.2.
Recourse Against Basic Rights Violations due to the Incorrect Interpretation and Application of `the Law'
187
4.4.
Federal Constitutional Court as a Lighthouse
195
4.4.1.
Individual's Way to the BVerfG: A "Citizens' Court"?
195
4.4.2.
Constitutional Judgments on the Merits: The BVerfG's Deference to German Ordinary Courts
200
4.5.
Chapter Conclusions
206
References
207
5.
Constitutional Review in Mexico: A Best of All Worlds Solution?
213
5.1.
Brief Recap on the Leading Systems of Constitutional Review and Fundamental Rights
218
5.1.1.
American and the European "Models" Prima Facie
218
5.1.2.
"Models" and Fundamental Rights Enforcement
220
5.2.
Mexican System Between Two Models (1847--2011)
224
5.2.1.
American Influence in Mexican Judicial Review (1847--1987)
224
5.2.2.
"Turn" Towards Continental Europe (1987--2011)
231
5.3.
Expediente Varios 912/2010 and the Incorporation of Diffused Constitutional Review in Mexico
237
5.3.1.
"Judicial" Incorporation of Diffused Review
238
5.3.2.
Nuevo Leon Judgment and the Bills on Diffused Control
242
5.4.
Qualified Majorities in the Supreme Court as a Rule-of-Law Distortion
246
5.4.1.
What the Constitution Says
246
5.4.2.
What the Supreme Court Does
249
5.5.
Some Urgent Reforms
250
5.5.1.
Real Empowerment for the Ordinary Courts
250
5.5.2.
Let the Supreme Court Be Supreme: Exemplary Function of the Constitutional Jurisdiction
251
5.6.
Chapter Conclusions
253
References
256
6.
General Conclusions
259
6.1.
Theoretical Legal Requirements for Rule-of-Law Achievement
259
6.2.
Current American Constitutional Review Matches the Model
260
6.3.
Present-Day German Constitutional Review Matches the Model
261
6.4.
Mexican Constitutional Review Does Not Match the Model
262