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001099958 1001_ $$aCarlton, Dennis W.$$0n  82246334 $$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n82246334
001099958 24510 $$aModern industrial organization /$$cDennis W. Carlton, Jeffrey M. Perloff.
001099958 250__ $$aFourth edition.
001099958 264_1 $$aBoston :$$bPearson/Addison Wesley,$$c[2005]
001099958 264_4 $$c©2005
001099958 300__ $$axxiii, 822 pages :$$billustrations ;$$c24 cm.
001099958 336__ $$atext$$btxt$$2rdacontent
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001099958 4901_ $$aThe Addison-Wesley series in economics
001099958 504__ $$aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 737-779) and index.
001099958 50500 $$gPart 1 --$$tIntroduction and theory 1 --$$gChapter 1. --$$tOverview --$$tmodels --$$tPrice Theory --$$tTransaction Costs --$$tGame Theory --$$tContestable Markets --$$tOrganization --$$tBasic Theory --$$tMarket Structures --$$tBusiness Practices: Strategies and Conduct --$$tInformation, Advertising, and Disclosure --$$tDynamic Models and Market Clearing --$$tGovernment Policies and Their Effects --$$gChapter 2. --$$tThe Firm and Costs --$$tThe Firm --$$tThe Objective of a Firm --$$tOwnership and Control --$$tMergers and Acquisitions --$$tReasons for Mergers and Acquisitions --$$tMerger Activity in the United States --$$tMerger Activities in Other Countries --$$tEmpirical Evidence on the Efficiency and Profitability of Mergers --$$tCost Concepts --$$tTypes of Costs --$$tCost Concepts --$$tEconomies of Scale --$$tReasons for Economies of Scale --$$tTotal Costs Determine Scale Economies --$$tA Measure of Scale Economies --$$tEmpirical Studies of Cost Curves --$$tEconomies of Scale in Total Manufacturing Costs --$$tSurvivorship Studies --$$tCost Concepts for Multiproduct Firms --$$tAdaptation of Traditional Cost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm --$$tEconomies of Scope --$$tEconomies of Scale and Economies of Scope --$$tSpecialization in Manufacturing --$$tAn Example of an Industry with Economies of Scope --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 2A --$$tCost Concepts for a Multiproduct Firm --$$tExample 2.1 --$$tValue of Limited Liability --$$tExample 2.2 --$$tConflicts of Interest Between Managers and share holders --$$tExample 2.3 --$$tSpecialization of Labor --$$tExample 2.4 --$$tIndiana Libraries --$$tExample 2.5 --$$tThe Baking Industry --$$tExample 2.6 --$$tElectricity Minimum Efficient Scale and Scope --$$gPart 2 --$$tMarket Structures --$$gChapter 3. --$$tCompetition --$$tPerfect Competition --$$tAssumptions --$$tThe Behavior of a Single Firm --$$tThe Competitive Market --$$tElasticities and The Residual Demand Curve --$$tElasticities of Demand and Supply --$$tThe Residual Demand Curve of Price Takers --$$tEfficiency and Welfare --$$tEfficiency --$$tWelfare --$$tEntry and Exit --$$tRestrictions On Entry --$$tCompetition with Few Firms-Contestability --$$tDefinition of Barriers to Entry --$$tIdentifying Barriers to Entry --$$tThe Size of Entry Barriers by Industry --$$tExternalities --$$tLimitations of Perfect Competition --$$tThe Many Meanings of Competition --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tExample 3.1 --$$tAre Farmers Price Takers? --$$tExample 3.2 --$$tRestrictions on Entry Across Countries --$$tExample 3.3 --$$tFTC Opposes Internet Bans That Harm Competition --$$tExample 3.4 --$$tIncreasing Congestion --$$gChapter 4. --$$tMonopolies, Monopsonies, and Dominant Firms --$$tMonopoly Behavior --$$tProfit Maximization --$$tMonopoly Power --$$tThe Incentive for Efficient Operation --$$tMonopoly Behavior over Time --$$tThe Costs and Benefits of Monopoly --$$tThe Deadweight Loss of Monopoly --$$tRent-Seeking Behavior --$$tMonopoly Profits and Deadweight Loss Vary with the Elasticity of Demand --$$tThe Benefits of Monopoly --$$tCreating and Maintaining a Monopoly --$$tKnowledge Advantage --$$tGovernment-Created Monopolies --$$tNatural Monopoly --$$tProfits and Monopoly --$$tIs Any Firm That Earns a Positive Profit a Monopoly? --$$tDoes a Monopoly Always Earn a Positive Profit? --$$tAre Monopoly Mergers to Eliminate Short-Run Losses Desirable? --$$tMonopsony --$$tDominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe --$$tWhy Some Firms Are Dominant --$$tThe No-Entry Model --$$tA Model with Free, Instantaneous Entry --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tExample 4.1 --$$tMonopoly Newspaper Ad Prices --$$tExample 4.2 --$$tMonopolizing by Merging --$$tExample 4.3 --$$tControlling a key Ingredient --$$tExample 4.4 --$$tPreventing Imitation-Cat Got Your Tongue? --$$tExample 4.5 --$$tProtecting a Monopoly --$$tExample 4.6 --$$tEu Allows merger to Eliminate Losses --$$tExample 4.7 --$$tPriest Monopsony --$$tExample 4.8 --$$tPrice Umbrella --$$tExample 4.9 --$$tChina Tobacco Monopoly to Become a Dominant Firm.
001099958 50500 $$gChapter 5. --$$tCartels --$$tWhy Cartels Form --$$tCreating and Enforcing the Cartel --$$tFactors That Facilitate the Formation of Cartels --$$tEnforcing a Cartel Agreement --$$tCartels and Price Wars --$$tConsumers Gain as Cartels Fail --$$tPrice-Fixing Laws --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 5A --$$tThe Effects of Cartel Size --$$tExample 5.1 --$$tAn Electrifying Conspiracy --$$tExample 5.2 --$$tThe Viability of Commodity Cartels --$$tExample 5.3 --$$tConcrete Example of Government-Aided Collusion --$$tExample 5.4 --$$tRelieving the Headache of Running a cartel --$$tExample 5.5 --$$tVitamins Cartel --$$tExample 5.6 --$$tHow Consumers Were Railroaded --$$tExample 5.7 --$$tThe Social Costs of Cartelization --$$tExample 5.8 --$$tProsecuting Global Cartels --$$gChapter 6. --$$tOligopoly --$$tGame Theory --$$tSingle-Period Oligopoly Models --$$tNash Equilibrium --$$tThe Cournot Model --$$tThe Bertrand Model --$$tThe Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model --$$tA Comparison of the Major Oligopoly Models --$$tMultiperiod Games --$$tSingle-Period Prisoners' Dilemma Game --$$tInfinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma Game --$$tTypes of Equilibria in Multiperiod Games --$$tExperimental Evidence on Oligopoly Models --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 6A --$$tA Mathematical Derivation of Cournot and Stackelberg Equilibria --$$tAppendix 6B --$$tMixed Strategies --$$tExample 6.1 --$$tDo Birds of a Feather Cournot-Flock Together? --$$tExample 6.2 --$$tOligopoly Welfare Losses --$$tExample 6.3 --$$tMergers in a Cournot Economy --$$tExample 6.4 --$$tRoller Coaster Gasoline --$$tExample 6.5 --$$tCopying Pricing --$$tExample 6.6 --$$tCar Wars --$$gChapter 7. --$$tProduct Differentiation and Monopolistic Competition --$$tDifferentiated Products --$$tThe Effect of Differentiation on a Firm's Demand Curve --$$tPreferences for Characteristics of Products --$$tThe Representative Consumer Model --$$tA Representative Consumer Model with Undifferentiated Products --$$tA Representative Consumer Model with Differentiated Products --$$tConclusions about Representative Consumer Models --$$tLocation Models --$$tHotelling's Location Model --$$tSalop's Circle Model --$$tHybrid Models --$$tEstimation of Differentiated Goods Models --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 7A --$$tWelfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Homogeneous Products --$$tAppendix 7B --$$tWelfare in a Monopolistic Competition Model with Differentiated Products --$$tExample 7.1 --$$tAll Water Is Not the Same --$$tExample 7.2 --$$tEntry Lowers Prices --$$tExample 7.3 --$$tThe Jeans Market --$$tExample 7.4 --$$tA Serial Problem --$$tExample 7.5 --$$tCombining Beers --$$gChapter 8. --$$tIndustry Structure and Performance --$$tTheories of Price Markups and Profits --$$tStructure-Conduct-Performance --$$tMeasures of Market Performance --$$tRates of Return --$$tPrice-Cost Margins --$$tMeasures of Market Structure --$$tThe Relationship of Structure to Performance --$$tModern Structure-Conduct-Performance Analysis --$$tTheory --$$tEmpirical Research --$$tValue of Modern Approaches to measuring Performance --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tAppendix 8A --$$tRelationship Between the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Price-Cost Margin --$$tAppendix 8B --$$tIdentifying Market Power --$$tExample 8.1 --$$tSupermarkets and Concentration --$$tExample 8.2 --$$tHow Sweet It Is --$$gPart 3 --$$tBusiness Practices: Strategies and Conduct --$$gChapter 9. --$$tPrice Discrimination --$$tNonuniform Pricing --$$tIncentive and Conditions for Price Discrimination --$$tProfit Motive for Price Discrimination --$$tConditions for Price Discrimination --$$tResales --$$tTypes of Price Discrimination --$$tPerfect Price Discrimination --$$tDifferent Prices to Different Groups --$$tOther Methods of Third-Degree Price Discrimination --$$tWelfare Effects of Price Discrimination --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 9A --$$tAn Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders --$$tExample 9.1 --$$tCoupons --$$tExample 9.2 --$$tThank You, Doctor --$$tExample 9.3 --$$tHalting Drug Sales from Canada --$$tExample 9.4 --$$tVertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal --$$tExample 9.5 --$$tA Discriminating Labor Union --$$tExample 9.6 --$$tDoes Competition Always Lower Price?
001099958 50500 $$gChapter 10. --$$tAdvanced Topics in Pricing --$$tNonlinear Pricing --$$tA Single Two-Part Tariff --$$tTwo Two-Part Tariffs --$$tTie-in Sales --$$tGeneral Justifications for Tie-in Sales --$$tTie-in Sales as a Method of Price Discrimination --$$tPackage Tie-in Sales of Independent Products --$$tInterrelated Demands --$$tQuality Choice --$$tOther Methods of Nonlinear Pricing --$$tMinimum Quantities and Quantity Discounts --$$tSelection of Price Schedules --$$tPremium for Priority --$$tAuctions --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tAppendix 10A --$$tThe Optimal Two-Part Tariff --$$tAppendix 10B --$$tNonlinear Pricing with an Example --$$tExample 10.1 --$$tFootball Tariffs --$$tExample 10.2 --$$tYou Auto Save from Tie-in Sales --$$tExample 10.3 --$$tStuck Holding the Bag --$$tExample 10.4 --$$tTied to TV --$$tExample 10.5 --$$tNot Too Suite-Mixed Bundling --$$tExample 10.6 --$$tPrice Discriminating on eBay --$$gChapter 11. --$$tStrategic Behavior --$$tStrategic Behavior Defined --$$tNoncooperative Strategic Behavior --$$tPredatory Pricing --$$tLimit Pricing --$$tInvestments to Lower Production Costs --$$tRaising Rivals' Costs --$$tWelfare Implications and the Role of the Courts --$$tCooperative Strategic Behavior --$$tPractices That Facilitate Collusion --$$tCooperative Strategic Behavior and the Role of the Courts --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 11A: --$$tThe Strategic Use of Tie-in Sales and Product Compatibility to Create or Maintain Market Power with Applications to Networks --$$tExample 11.1 --$$tSupreme Court Says Alleged Predation Must Be Credible --$$tExample 11.2 --$$tEvidence of Predatory Pricing in Tobacco --$$tExample 11.3 --$$tThe Shrinking Share of Dominant Firms --$$tExample 11.4 --$$tAnd Only a Smile Remained --$$tExample 11.5 --$$tStrategic Behavior and Rapid Technological Change: The Microsoft Case --$$tExample 11.6 --$$tValue of Preventing Entry --$$tExample 11.7 --$$tThe FTC Versus Ethyl, et al. --$$tExample 11.8 --$$tInformation Exchanges: The Hardwood Case --$$gChapter 12. --$$tVertical Integration and Vertical Restrictions --$$tThe Reasons for and Against Vertical Integration --$$tIntegration to Lower Transaction Costs --$$tIntegration to Assure Supply --$$tIntegration to Eliminate Externalities --$$tIntegration to Avoid Government Intervention --$$tIntegration to Increase Monopoly Profits --$$tIntegration to Eliminate Market Power --$$tThe Life Cycle of a Firm --$$tVertical Restrictions --$$tVertical Restrictions Used to Solve Problems in Distribution --$$tThe Effects of Vertical Restrictions --$$tBanning Vertical Restrictions --$$tFranchising --$$tEmpirical Evidence --$$tEvidence on Vertical Integration --$$tEvidence on Vertical Restrictions --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tExample 12.1 --$$tOutsourcing --$$tExample 12.2 --$$tPreventing Holdups --$$tExample 12.3 --$$tOwn Your Own Steel Mill --$$tExample 12.4 --$$tDouble Mark up --$$tExample 12.5 --$$tBlockbuster's Solution to the Double Manginalization Problem --$$tExample 12.6 --$$tFree Riding on the Web --$$tExample 12.7 --$$tBrewing Trouble; Restructing Vertical Integration in Alcoholic Beverage Industries --$$gPart 4 --$$tInformation Advertising, and Disclosure --$$gChapter 13. --$$tInformation --$$tWhy Information is Limited --$$tLimited Information About Quality --$$tThe Market for "Lemons" --$$tSolving the Problem: Equal Information --$$tEvidence on Lemons Markets --$$tLimited Information About Price --$$tThe Tourist-Trap Model --$$t*The Tourists-and-Natives Model --$$tProviding Consumer Information Lowers Price --$$tHow Information Lowers Prices --$$tAn Example: Grocery Store Information Programs --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 13A --$$tMarket Shares in the Tourists-and-Natives Model --$$tExample 13.1 --$$tGenetically Modified Organisons: Do Consumers NOT care or Not Read? --$$tExample 13.2 --$$tUnderstanding Consumer Information --$$tExample 13.3 --$$tCounteriest Halal Heat --$$tExample 13.4 --$$tCertifying Thoaugh Breads --$$tExample 13.5 --$$tPrice Dispersion and Search Costs in the Talmud --$$tExample 13.6 --$$tPrice Dispersion --$$tExample 13.7 --$$tTourist Cemeras --$$gChapter 14. --$$tAdvertising and Disclosure --$$tInformation and Advertising --$$tPromotions --$$t"Search" Versus "Experience" Goods --$$tInformational Versus Persuasive Advertising --$$tProfit-Maximizing Advertising --$$tEffects of Advertising on Welfare --$$tPrice Advertising Increases Welfare --$$tAdvertising to Solve the Lemons Problem --$$tWhen Advertising Is Excessive --$$tFalse Advertising --$$tLimits to Lying --$$tAntifraud Laws --$$tDisclosure Laws --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 14A --$$tProfit-Maximizing Advertising --$$tExample 14.1 --$$tBranding and Labeling --$$tExample 14.2 --$$tCelebrity Endorsements --$$tExample 14.3 --$$tMilk Advertising --$$tExample 14.4 --$$tSocial Gain from Price Advertising: --$$tExample 14.5 --$$tWelfare Effects of Restricting Alcohol Ads --$$tExample 14.6 --$$tLet All Who Are Hungry Come and Eat --$$gPart 5 --$$tDynamic Models and Market Clearing.
001099958 50500 $$gChapter 15. --$$tDecision Making Over Time: Durability --$$tHow Long Should a Durable Good Last? --$$tCompetitive Firm's Choice of Durability --$$tThe Monopoly's Choice of Durability --$$tCostly Installation and Maintenance --$$tRenting Versus Selling by a Monopoly --$$tResale Market --$$t*Consumers' Expectations Constrain the Monopoly --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tAppendix 15A --$$tMultiperiod Durable Goods Monopoly --$$tExample 15.1 --$$tUnited Shoe --$$tExample 15.2 --$$tThe Importance of Used Goods --$$tExample 15.3 --$$tThe Alcoa Case: Secondhand Economics --$$tExample 15.4 --$$tLeasing Under Adverse Selection --$$tExample 15.5 --$$tSales versus Rentals --$$tExample 15.6 --$$tLowering the Resale Price of Used Textbooks --$$gChapter 16. --$$tPatents and Technological Change --$$tPatents, Copyrights, and Trademarks --$$tPatents --$$tCopyrights --$$tTrademarks --$$tDistinctions Between Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks --$$tIncentives for Inventions are Needed --$$tImitation Discourages Research --$$tPatents Encourage Research --$$tPatents Encourage Disclosure --$$t*Patents, Prizes, Research Contracts, and Joint Ventures --$$tDetermining the Optimal Number of Firms --$$tNo Government Incentives --$$tGovernment-Financed Research --$$tPrizes --$$tRelaxing Antitrust Laws: Joint Ventures --$$tPatents --$$tGovernment Uncertainty --$$tPatent Holders May Manufacture or License --$$tEliminating Patents --$$tMarket Structure --$$tMarket Structure Without a Patent Race --$$tOptimal Timing of Innovations --$$tMonopolies in Patent Races --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tExample 16.1 --$$tPiracy --$$tExample 16.2 --$$tPatents Versus Secrets --$$tExample 16.3 --$$tMonkey see, Monkey Do --$$tExample 16.4 --$$tJoint Public-Private R & D --$$tExample 16.5 --$$tPrizes --$$tExample 16.6 --$$tMickey Mouse Legislative --$$tExample 16.7 --$$tEuropean Patents --$$tExample 16.8 --$$tPatent, Thicket --$$gChapter 17. --$$tHow Markets Clear: Theory and Facts --$$tHow Markets Clear: Three Simple Theories --$$tCompetition --$$tOligopoly Models --$$tMonopoly --$$tEmpirical Evidence on the Role of Price in Allocating Goods --$$tThe Rigidity of Prices --$$tMovements in Prices and Price-Cost Margins over the Business Cycle --$$tExplaining the Evidence --$$tExtensions to the Simple Theory: The Introduction of Time --$$tFixed Costs of Changing Price --$$tImplications of an Unchanging Price for Inventories --$$tAsymmetric Information and Moral Hazard --$$tToward a General Theory of Allocation --$$tMarket Structure is More Than Concentration --$$tProduce-to-Order Versus Produce-to-Stock --$$tTransmission of Shocks in Industries with Fixed Prices --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tExample 17.1 --$$tPrice Rigidity: It's the Real Thing --$$tExample 17.2 --$$tHow Much Is That Turkey in the Window? --$$tExample 17.3 --$$tThe Cost of Changing Prices --$$tExample 17.4 --$$tCreating Futures Markets --$$gPart 6 --$$tGovernment Policies and Their Effects --$$gChapter 18. --$$tInternational Trade --$$tReasons for Trade Between Countries --$$tComparative Advantage --$$tIntra-Industry Trade in Differentiated Products --$$tFree Riding, International Price Differences, and Gray Markets --$$tDumping --$$tTariffs, Subsidies, and Quotas --$$tCompetition --$$tCreating and Battling Monopolies --$$tStrategic Trade Policy --$$tIndustries with Positive Externalities --$$tEmpirical Evidence on Intervention in International Trade --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tAppendix 18A --$$tDerivation of the Optimal Subsidy --$$tExample 18.1 --$$tGray Markets --$$tExample 18.2 --$$tTimber Wars and Retaliation --$$tExample 18.3 --$$tForeign Doctors --$$tExample 18.4 --$$tBeing Taken for a Ride: Japanese Cars --$$tExample 18.5 --$$tWide-Body Aircraft --$$tExample 18.6 --$$tSteeling from U.S. Customers --$$gChapter 19. --$$tAntitrust Laws and Policy --$$tThe Antitrust Laws and Their Purposes --$$tAntitrust Statutes --$$tEnforcement --$$tGoals of the Antitrust Laws --$$tWho May Sue? --$$tEconomic Theory of Damages --$$tThe Use of U.S. Antitrust Laws --$$tPrivate Litigation --$$tMarket Power and the Definition of Markets --$$tMarket Power --$$tMarket Definition --$$tCooperation Among Competitors --$$tPrice-Fixing and Output Agreements --$$tNot All Agreements Among Competitors Are Illegal --$$tInformation Exchanges Among Competitors --$$tOligopoly Behavior --$$tMergers --$$tExclusionary Actions and Other Strategic Behavior --$$tCompetition Between Rivals --$$tCompetitive Behavior Deemed Undesirable by the Court --$$tVertical Arrangements Between Firms --$$tPrice Discrimination --$$tPrice Discrimination Under Robinson-Patman --$$tTie-in Sales --$$tEffects of Antitrust Laws on the Organization of Firms --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tExample 19.1 --$$tUsing the Government to Create Market Power: Misuse of the Orange Book --$$tExample 19.2 --$$tConflict Between European an U.S. Antitrust Authorities: GE-Hneywell --$$tExample 19.3 --$$tThe Merger Guidelines --$$tExample 19.4 --$$tAntitrust Laws in Other Countries --$$tExample 19.5 --$$tColleges and Antitrust: Does Your School Belong to a Cartel? --$$tExample 19.6 --$$tThe FTC Plays with Toys '' Us --$$gChapter 20. --$$tRegulation and Deregulation --$$tThe Objectives of Regulators --$$tMarket Inefficiencies --$$tCorrecting Market Inefficiencies --$$tCapture Theory and Interest-Group Theory --$$tMaking Monopolies More Competitive --$$tGovernment Ownership --$$tPrivatizing --$$tFranchise Bidding --$$tPrice Controls --$$t*Rate-of-Return Regulation --$$tQuality Effects --$$tMaking Competitive Industries More Monopolistic --$$tLimiting Entry --$$tAgricultural Regulations: Price Supports and Quantity Controls --$$tDeregulation --$$tAirlines --$$tGround Transportation --$$tSummary --$$tProblems --$$tSuggested Readings --$$tExample 20.1 --$$tPizza Protection --$$tExample 20.2 --$$tCross-Subsidization --$$tExample 20.3 --$$tLegal Monopolies --$$tExample 20.4 --$$tPublic, Monopolistic, and Competitive Refuse Collection --$$tExample 20.5 --$$tRent Control --$$tExample 20.6 --$$tBrewing Trouble --$$tExample 20.7 --$$tDeregulating Electricity: California in Shock --$$tExample 20.8 --$$tInternational and U.S. Deregulation in Telecommunications --$$tExample 20.9 --$$tEuropean Deregulation of Airlines.
001099958 520__ $$aProblems -- Suggested Readings -- Appendix 9A -- An Example of Price Discrimination: Agricultural Marketing Orders -- Example 9.1 -- Coupons -- Example 9.2 -- Thank You, Doctor -- Example 9.3 -- Halting Drug Sales from Canada -- Example 9.4 -- Vertical Integration as a Means of Price Discrimination: Alcoa Shows Its True Metal -- Example 9.5 -- A Discriminating Labor Union -- Example 9.6 -- Does Competition Always Lower Price?
001099958 650_0 $$aIndustrial organization (Economic theory)$$0sh 85065909 $$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85065909
001099958 650_7 $$aIndustrial organization (Economic theory)$$2fast$$0(OCoLC)fst00971428$$0http://id.worldcat.org/fast/971428
001099958 7001_ $$aPerloff, Jeffrey M.$$0n  79016719 $$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n79016719
001099958 830_0 $$aAddison-Wesley series in economics.$$0n  42001171 $$0http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/n42001171
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