LOCATION4th Floor
Call No. K955 .L58 2013
Author Liu, Jing, 1985 May 1- author.
Title Compensating ecological damage : comparative and economic observations / Jing Liu.
Location Volume/Copy Barcode Status
 4th Floor  K955 .L58 2013    3500501351345Z  
 Acknowledgementsv
 List Of Abbreviationsxvii
 List Of Figures And Tablesxxi
ch. 1 Introduction1
1.Background1
2.Research Questions and Problem Definitions4
3.Methodology6
4.Structure10
 Part I Compensation Models for Ecological Damage: Theoretical Framework13
ch. 2 The Definitions And Characteristics Of Ecological Damage17
1.Introduction17
2.The Choice of a Concept - Environmental Damage, Ecological Damage and Natural Resources Damage18
2.1.Relevant Concepts in Legal Documents and Literature18
2.1.1.Concepts in Legislation and Treaties18
2.1.1.1.Environmental Damage18
2.1.1.2.Pollution20
2.1.1.3.Damage to the Environment, Impairment of the Environment and other Related Concepts21
2.1.1.4.Natural Resources Damage23
2.1.2.Concepts in Literature23
2.1.2.1.Environmental Damage and Pollution Damage23
2.1.2.2.Natural Resources Damage24
2.1.2.3.Ecological Damage24
2.2.The Choice of the Concept25
2.2.1.Environment, Natural Resources and Ecology26
2.2.2.The Choice and Definition of Concepts28
3.The Characteristics of Ecological Damage29
3.1.The Concept of Damage in Tort Law29
3.1.1.Damage and Relevant Concepts29
3.1.2.Definition of Damage30
3.1.3.Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Losses31
3.2.Ecological Damage: Does it Fit into the Traditional Tort Regimes?34
3.2.1.Damage to Owned Natural Resources34
3.2.2.Damage to Un-owned Natural Resources36
3.2.2.1.Cost of Restoration36
3.2.2.2.No Restoration37
3.2.3.Other Characteristics of Ecological Damage38
4.Definition of Compensation40
5.Conclusion41
ch. 3 Legal Rules Concerning The Prevention Of Ecological Damage: Economic Observations45
1.Introduction45
1.1.Regulation and Liability47
2.Liability Rules for Ecological Damage50
2.1.The Criteria in Designing Optimal Liability Rules50
2.2.Standing51
2.2.1.Legal Analysis52
2.2.1.1.Standing in the U.S52
2.2.1.2.Standing in the EU53
2.2.2.Tested in Economics61
2.2.2.1.Public Authority62
2.2.2.2.Environmental NGOs63
2.2.2.3.Individuals64
2.3.Liable Parties65
2.3.1.Economic Analysis65
2.3.2.Applied to Ecological Damage66
2.3.2.1.Definition of Liable Party66
2.3.2.2.Limitation of Victims Claiming against other Parties and Recourses68
2.4.Liability Standards69
2.4.1.Economic Analysis69
2.4.1.1.Primary Costs69
2.4.1.2.Tertiary Costs72
2.4.2.Liability Standards for Ecological Damage72
2.5.Causation and Multiple Tortfeasors75
2.5.1.Economic Analysis75
2.5.1.1.Uncertain Causation75
2.5.1.2.Multiple Tortfeasors77
2.5.2.Applied to Ecological Damage78
2.5.2.1.Uncertain Causation78
2.5.2.2.Multiple Tortfeasors79
2.6.Damages80
2.6.1.Economic Analysis80
2.6.2.Applied to Ecological Damage82
3.The Evaluation of Liability Rules84
3.1.How Do Liability Rules Contribute to Prevention and Compensation?85
3.1.1.Compensation85
3.1.2.Prevention86
3.2.Remedies - Compensation Mechanisms87
3.2.1.Compensation87
3.2.2.Prevention88
3.2.3.Risk Spreading and Costs89
4.Conclusion90
ch. 4 Analysis Of Specific Compensation Mechanisms95
1.Introduction95
1.1.A Brief Overview of Compensation Mechanisms for Ecological Damage95
1.2.Criteria for Compensation Mechanisms: Compensation, Prevention and Costs98
2.Liability Insurance103
2.1.The Basic Rationale of Liability Insurance103
2.1.1.Risk Aversion and the Law of Large Numbers103
2.1.2.Insurability105
2.1.3.Problems of Insurance106
2.1.3.1.Moral Hazard106
2.1.3.2.Adverse Selection107
2.2.Liability Insurance for Ecological Damage108
2.2.1.Insurability of Liability for Ecological Damage108
2.2.1.1.Characteristics of Ecological Damage Influencing Insurability108
2.2.1.2.Liability Rules Influencing Insurability109
2.2.2.Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection112
2.3.The Evaluation of Liability Insurance114
2.3.1.Primary Costs (Prevention)114
2.3.2.Secondary Costs (Compensation)115
2.3.3.Tertiary Costs118
2.3.4.Interaction between the Different Costs Reduction Goals118
2.4.Compulsory Insurance120
3.First-party and Direct Insurance122
3.1.Introduction: First-party Insurance and Direct Insurance122
3.2.The Feasibility of First-party Insurance and Direct Insurance in the Environmental Context124
3.2.1.First-party Insurance124
3.2.2.Direct Insurance126
3.2.2.1.Ecological Damage126
3.2.2.2.Traditional Damage127
3.3.The Evaluation of First-party Insurance and Direct Insurance128
3.3.1.First-party Insurance128
3.3.1.1.Primary Costs (Prevention)128
3.3.1.2.Secondary Costs (Compensation)128
3.3.2.Direct Insurance129
3.3.2.1.For Ecological Damage129
3.3.2.2.For Traditional Damage131
4.Risk-sharing Agreements131
4.1.Introduction to Risk-sharing Agreements131
4.2.Specific Institutional Arrangements of a Risk-sharing Agreement133
4.2.1.Examples of Risk-sharing Agreements133
4.2.2.Institutional Arrangements136
4.3.Evaluation of Risk-sharing Agreements137
4.3.1.Primary Costs137
4.3.2.Secondary Costs140
4.3.3.Tertiary Costs141
5.Environmental Funds142
5.1.Introduction: the Various Types of Environmental Funds142
5.1.1.Funds with or without Risk-spreading Functions and Ways to Finance the Funds144
5.1.2.Funds Established for the Benefits of Victims and Injurers145
5.1.3.Relationship to Liability Rules and Insurance146
5.2.Evaluation of the Various Funds149
5.2.1.Environmental Funds to Cover Liability152
5.2.1.1.Environmental Funds as One Type of Financial Guarantees152
5.2.1.2.Funds Offering an Upper Layer of Compensation152
5.2.2.Complementary Funds153
5.2.3.Environmental Funds Irrespective of Liability153
5.3.Conclusion154
6.Security Mechanisms Provided by the Liable Party or by a Third-party Guarantor155
6.1.The Various Security Mechanisms155
6.1.1.Self-insurance and Captives155
6.1.2.Mortgages and Liens157
6.1.3.Deposits, Trust Funds and Escrow Agreements157
6.1.4.Corporate Guarantees, Bank Guarantees and Surety Bonds157
6.2.Analysis: From the Perspective of Compensation and Prevention158
6.2.1.Self-insurance and Captives159
6.2.2.Mortgages and Liens160
6.2.3.Deposits, Trust Funds and Escrow Agreements161
6.2.4.Corporate Guarantees, Bank Guarantees and Surety Bonds161
7.The Use of the Capital Market to Provide Coverage162
8.Conclusion: Comparison between Individual Instruments and Policy Recommendations165
8.1.Liability Insurance166
8.2.First-party Insurance and Direct Insurance167
8.3.Risk-sharing Agreement167
8.4.Environmental Funds168
8.5.Guarantees by the Polluters169
ch. 5 Compensation Models For Ecological Damage173
1.Introduction173
2.Proposed Models to Prevent and Compensate for Ecological Damage174
2.1.Compensation, Liability Rules, and Insolvency174
2.1.1.Recalling Characteristics of Ecological Damage174
2.1.2.Mandatory Financial Security175
2.2.Models of Compensation177
2.2.1.Model I: Mandatory Financial Security177
2.2.2.Model II: Voluntary Financial Security182
2.2.3.Model III: Optimal Financial Cap184
3.Towards a Multilayered Approach to Compensate for Ecological Damage185
3.1.Factors Influencing the Choice of Instruments186
3.2.When the Liable Party is Identifiable187
3.3.When the Liable Party is not Identifiable189
 Part II Empirical Part191
ch. 6 Compensation Systems Under The International Regime195
1.International Compensation System for Oil Pollution195
1.1.Liability Rules under the International Regimes on Compensation for Oil Pollution195
1.1.1.Liability Rules under the CLC Regime196
1.1.1.1.The Adoption of the 1969 CLC and the 1971 Fund Convention196
1.1.1.2.The 1984 and 1992 Protocols197
1.1.2.Liability Rules under the Bunker Convention199
1.2.Compensation Instruments for Oil Pollution Damage200
1.2.1.Protection and Indemnity Policies201
1.2.2.Compensation Funds202
1.2.2.1.The 1971 Fund202
1.2.2.2.The 1992 Fund and the winding up of the 1971 Fund203
1.2.2.3.The 2003 Supplementary Fund204
1.3.Critical Analysis205
2.The International Compensation System for Nuclear Damage207
2.1.International Regimes for Compensation of Nuclear Damage209
2.1.1.Origins of International Regimes209
2.1.2.First Generation of Nuclear Liability Conventions210
2.1.2.1.Strict Liability211
2.1.2.2.Channeling of Liability212
2.1.2.3.Limited Liability212
2.1.2.4.Financial Security213
2.1.2.5.Exclusive Jurisdiction213
2.1.2.6.Public Funding214
2.1.3.The Second Generation of Nuclear Liability Conventions214
2.1.3.1.General Issues214
2.1.3.2.The Coverage of Environmental Damage217
2.2.Evaluation from a Law and Economics Perspective221
2.2.1.Liability221
2.2.2.Financial Security223
2.2.2.1.Public Funds223
2.2.2.2.Insurance224
2.2.2.3.Pooling226
ch. 7 Compensation Systems In The U.S.231
1.Compensation System for Nuclear Damage in the U.S231
1.1.Liability for Nuclear Damage232
1.2.The Requirement of Financial Protection236
1.2.1.Financial Requirement for Third-party Liability236
1.2.2.Financial Requirement for Property Damage238
1.2.3.Compensation under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation238
1.2.4.Financial Requirement for Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities and Financing for Nuclear Waste Disposal239
1.3.The Instruments to Compensate for Nuclear Damage240
1.3.1.Nuclear Liability Insurance240
1.3.1.1.Basic Content240
1.3.1.2.Risk Differentiation243
1.3.2.The Retrospective Premiums Scheme244
1.3.3.The Mutual Pool for Property Damage246
1.4.Critical Analysis247
1.4.1.Combined Use of Regulation, Liability and Compensation Instruments248
1.4.2.Is there a Subsidy for the Nuclear Sector?249
1.4.3.Compulsory Financial Requirements252
1.4.4.Multiple Layers of Compensation Instruments253
1.4.5.Use of Insurance and Risk-sharing Pools254
1.4.6.Private Interest Approach255
2.The Compensation System for Natural Resources Damage in the U.S.257
2.1.Introduction257
2.2.Compensation System for Oil Pollution258
2.2.1.Liability for Oil Pollution259
2.2.1.1.Liability under the OPA259
2.2.1.2.State Statutes263
2.2.2.Financial Responsibility and Trust Fund263
2.2.2.1.Financial Responsibility: General264
2.2.2.2.P&I Clubs and Insurance264
2.2.2.3.Trust Fund266
2.3.Compensation System for Damage Caused by Hazardous Substances266
2.3.1.Liability under the CERCLA267
2.3.1.1.Response Action and Natural Resources Damage267
2.3.1.2.Responsible Parties and the Scope of Liability269
2.3.1.3.Stringent Liability and the Relief of Liability270
2.3.2.Financial Responsibility and the Trust Funds under the CERCLA272
2.3.2.1.Financial Responsibility: General272
2.3.2.2.Insurance273
2.3.2.3.Trust Funds274
2.4.Empirical Data about Natural Resources Damage in the U.S275
2.5.Economic Analysis276
2.5.1.Liability Rules277
2.5.1.1.Liability Rules under the OPA277
2.5.1.2.Liability Rules under the CERCLA279
2.5.2.Financial Responsibility282
2.5.2.1.Financial Responsibility under the OPA282
2.5.2.2.Financial Responsibility under the CERCLA284
2.5.3.Trust Funds285
2.5.3.1.Trust Fund under the OPA285
2.5.3.2.Trust Fund under the CERCLA285
ch. 8 Compensation Systems In The EU And Some EU Member States287
1.The Compensation System under the ELD287
2.Compensation Mechanisms Used in Member States293
2.1.Liability Insurance in Germany294
2.2.Direct Insurance in the Netherlands296
2.3.Risk-sharing Agreements in Germany299
2.3.1.Nuclear Liability299
2.3.2.Pooling System301
2.4.Environmental Funds in the Netherlands303
3.Critical Analysis304
ch. 9 Conclusion Of Part II309
1.A Comparison of the Systems309
2.The Compensation Models316
3.The Choice between Different Compensation Instruments317
4.The Divergence of Practice from Theoretical Models and Indicators318
4.1.Inefficiency of Liability Rules318
4.2.Broad Use of Environmental Funds318
4.3.Implementation of Financial Requirement318
 Part III Towards an Efficient Compensation System in China321
ch. 10 Compensation System For Ecological Damage In China And Policy Recommendations323
1.Introduction323
1.1.Theory: Environmental Liability in Past and Present324
1.1.1.Basis of Liability324
1.1.2.Scope of Liability: Is Natural Resources Damage Covered?326
1.1.3.Standing329
1.1.4.Causation, Multiple Tortfeasors and Burden of Proof332
1.1.5.Quantification333
1.2.Practice335
1.2.1.Who Acts after an Accident?335
1.2.2.Barriers to Access to Justice336
1.2.3.NGOs339
1.2.4.Remedies341
1.3.Summary343
2.Environmental Insurance344
2.1.Theory344
2.1.1.Statutory Background345
2.1.2.Theoretical Insurance Options346
2.2.Practice347
2.2.1.Insolvency Risk - Compulsory Insurance?347
2.2.2.Environmental Insurance in Practice348
2.2.3.Difficulties and Limits352
2.3.Summary353
3.Compensation for Vessel-induced Marine Oil Pollution354
3.1.Theory354
3.1.1.Scope of Compensable Damage and Quantification of Damage354
3.1.2.Standing358
3.1.3.Mandatory Financial Security359
3.1.4.Compensation Funds360
3.2.Practice361
3.2.1.Filing Claims361
3.2.2.Compensation via P&I Clubs362
3.2.3.Remedies364
3.2.4.Cases365
3.2.5.Challenges367
4.Economic Analysis of the Chinese Compensation System for Natural Resources Damage367
4.1.Liability Rules367
4.2.Insurance369
4.3.Marine Oil Pollution370
5.Recommendations to Improve the Compensation System371
5.1.Legal Framework371
5.2.Practical Issues372
ch. 11 Conclusion And Policy Recommendations375
1.Summary377
2.Proposed Models to Prevent and Compensate for Ecological Damage378
3.Indicators to Choose Compensation Instruments and a Multilayered Compensation Approach382
4.The Compensation System in China and Policy Recommendations386
5.Limits and Future Research388
 Summary: Compensating Ecological Damage: Comparative And Economic Observations391
 Policy Documents, Guidelines, Reports399
 Legislation405
 Bibliography413
 Curriculum Vitae449
Published Cambridge, United Kingdom ; Antwerp [Belgium] ; Portland [Oregon] : Intersentia, [2013]
©2013.
Description xxi, 449 pages : illustrations ; 24 cm.
Series Ius commune europaeum ; 118
Ius commune europaeum ; 118.
Note "METRO."
Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universiteit Maastricht, 2013
Bibliography Includes bibliographical references (pages 413-447).
Summary This book focuses on ecological damage: the damage to private natural resources which have an ecological value in excess of their market value and the damage to public natural resources. Its aim is to design a compensation system, taking into account the interaction between regulation, liability rules and compensation mechanisms (such as liability insurance, direct insurance, risk-sharing agreements, environmental funds, other guarantees and capital markets), to both prevent and compensate for ecological damage. Three new compensation models are proposed in this research, mainly based on the desirability and feasibility of a mandatory financial security system. In addition to briefly exploring the existing experience in the US, the EU and international regimes, this book also provides both theoretical and empirical research on the Chinese compensation system, which the existing literature has largely neglected
Contents Part I. Compensation models for ecological damage : theoretical framework -- Definitions and characteristics of ecological damage -- Legal rules concerning the prevention of ecological damage : economic observations -- Analysis of specific compensation mechanisms -- Compensation models for ecological damage -- Part II. Empirical part -- Compensation systems under the international regime -- Compensation systems in the U.S. -- Compensation systems in the EU and some EU member states -- Part III. Towards an efficient compensation system in China -- Compensation system for ecological damage in China and policy recommendations -- Compensating ecological damage : comparative and economic observations -- Compensatie voor ecologische schade : rechtsvergelijkende en economische beschouwingen
Subject Liability for environmental damages.
Liability for environmental damages -- China.
Environmental law.
Environmental law -- China.
Corporate Author Maastrichts Europees Instituut voor Transnationaal Rechtswetenschappelijk Onderzoek.
ISBN 9781780681740 (paperback)
1780681747 (paperback)
OCLC No. or Control No. 875523907